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THE PEOPLE MADE ME DO IT: CAN THE PEOPLE OF THE
STATES INSTRUCT AND COERCE THEIR STATE
LEGISLATURES IN THE ARTICLE V CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT PROCESS?
VIERAM DAVID AMAR*
INTRODUCTION

For me, there is no place more exciting than California.
Where else can you find earthquakes, mudslides, internet boom
and bust stories, and Jerry Brown back in politics? Amid all this
unpredictability, however, it is nice to know that some constants
remain. For instance, one thing you can always count on in the
Golden State is that every year the voters will enact an initiative that gets struck down in court. And this last year was no
exception. In 1998, California voters enacted Proposition 225,1 a
fascinating law that implicates a host of deep constitutional
issues-namely, federalism, popular sovereignty, congressional
term limits, and the federal constitutional amendment process.
As expected, last summer the California Supreme Court invalidated the measure as violating Article V of the United States
Constitution.2
But this past year's story did not fit the usual mold in two
ways. First, unlike other California propositions of recent years,
Proposition 225 was not on the cutting edge. Voters in a number

* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. A.B.,
University of California at Berkeley, 1985; J.D., Yale Law School, 1988. I wish to
thank Dipanwita Amar, Akhil Amar, Larry Tribe, Jesse Choper, Walter Dellinger,
Elizabeth Garrett, Bruce Cain, Mike Paulsen, David Levine, Bill Wang, David Jung,
Evan Lee, Calvin Massey, Joe Grodin, Reuel Schiller, David Reis, Joel Paul, Ash
Bhagwat, Alan Brownstein, Jim Pfander, Eugene Volokh, and participants in the
University of illinois College of Law Faculty Workshop Series for their input on
earlier versions of this Essay. Special thanks are owed to Evan Caminker, with
whom I was originally planning to co-write this Essay. Many of the best ideas in
this piece are Evan's as much as mine.
1. See Bramberg v. Jones, 978 P.2d 1240 app. at 1252-57 (Cal. 1999) (providing
the text of the proposed law).
2. See id. at 1241, 1251-52.
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of other states had already enacted measures virtually identical
to Proposition 225, S and at least six other state and federal
courts had struck these measures down as violating Article V.4
And so, this Essay really concerns the constitutionality of a
nationwide movement of which California's experience is but one
small part. Second, unlike many other popular referendums, this
time it has been the reviewing courts, and not the voting public,
who have ignored constitutional first principles. The short of it
is that judges all across the country have gotten things fundamentally wrong here, and that ballot measures like Proposition
225 that have been passed nationwide are not unconstitutional,
or at least not unconstitutional for the reasons that have been
given.
To see this, let us start with what Proposition 225 and its
counterparts in other states do. This requires that we go back to
the Supreme Court's 1995 decision in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton,5 in which the Court held that neither state governments nor Congress can impose congressional term limits under
our existing Constitution.6 If such term limits are to come about,
the Thornton Court made clear that they require an amendment

of the Constitution through Article V.7 Backers of Proposition

3. For a discussion of the measures enacted in Nebraska, Arkansas, Colorado,
Maine, and Oklahoma, see Miller v. Moore, 169 F.3d 1119, 1121-22 (8th Cir. 1999);
League of Women Voters v. Gwadosky, 966 F. Supp. 52, 53-55 (D. Me. 1997); Donovan v. Priest, 931 S.W.2d 119, 119-24 (Ark. 1996); Morrissey v. Colorado, 951 P.2d
911, 913-14 & app. B at 919 (Colo. 1998); Opinion of the Justices, 673 A.2d 693,
694-98 (Me. 1996); In re Initiative Petition No. 364, 930 P.2d 186, 186-91 (Okla.
1996).
4. Measures similar to Proposition 225 have been struck down in the states of
Nebraska, Colorado, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Maine. See, e.g., Miller, 169 F.3d at
1121-22; Gwadosky, 966 F. Supp. at 53-55; Donovan, 931 S.W.2d at 119-24;
Morrissey, 951 P.2d at 913-14; Opinion of the Justices, 673 A.2d at 694-98; Initiative
Petition, 930 P.2d at 188-91; see also AFL-CIO v. Eu, 686 P.2d 609 (Cal. 1984) (invalidating earlier measure on the same grounds used to invalidate Proposition 225);
Simpson v. Cenarrusa, 944 P.2d 1372 (Idaho 1997) (invalidating measure similar to
Proposition 225 on other grounds); State ex rel. Harper v. Waltermire, 691 P.2d 826
(Mont. 1984) (invalidating state initiative for balanced budget amendment on the
same grounds as Proposition 225).
5. 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
6. See id. at 827.
7. See id. at 837 ("Any [congressional term limit] must come not by legislation
adopted either by Congress or by an individual State, but rather-as have other
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225, working with similar groups in other states, have tried to
move things along in that direction by enacting in each state a
plebiscitary initiative. Each initiative, among other things, "instructs" state and federal legislators in that state to pursue the
Article V amendment process by proposing, supporting, and ratifying a federal term limits amendment, a template version of
which is included in the initiative measure.' If a legislator fails
to take any of a number of defined steps along the Article V
path, the initiative provides that a
proposal and ratification
"scarlet letter" 9 designation be placed on the next election ballot
-indicating that the individual legislator has "DISREGARDED
VOTERS' INSTRUCTION ON TERM LIMITS."10
As indicated above, lower courts-most recently the California11
Supreme Court-uniformly have invalidated these measures.
The gist of these decisions is that scarlet letters and related
devices are coercive and that such coercion violates Article V of
the United States Constitution.' According to these decisions,
Article V requires that state legislatures be free and independent to make their own decisions through their own deliberative
processes when deciding whether to seek and/or ratify federal
constitutional amendments.
This logic has a certain appeal these days. A recent and very
prominent line of federalism decisions-the so-called state-commandeering or state-conscription cases like New York v. United

important changes in the electoral process-through the amendment procedures set
forth in Article V." (footnote omitted)).
8. The template amendment provides that "[n]o person may serve in the office of
U.S. Representative for more than three terms [and no] person may serve in the office of U.S. Senator for more than two terms." Bramberg v. Jones, 978 P.2d 1240,
1254 (Cal. 1999) (quoting Proposition 225).
9. This is my term, not one used in any initiative.
10. Bramberg, 978 P.2d at 1254 (quoting Proposition 225).
11. See supra note 4.
12. See, e.g., Miller v. Moore, 169 F.3d 1119, 1122-24 (8th Cir. 1999); League of
Women Voters v. Gwadosky, 966 F. Supp. 52, 54-62 (D. Me. 1997); Donovan v.
Priest, 931 S.W.2d 119, 122-28 (Ark. 1996); Bramberg, 978 P.2d at 1246-52;
Morrissey v. Colorado, 951 P.2d 911, 913-17 (Colo. 1998); Opinion of the Justices,
673 A.2d 693, 696 (Me. 1996); In re Initiative Petition No. 364, 930 P.2d 186, 191-93
(Okla. 1996).
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States13 and United States v. Printz'4 --might be read as creating
a deliberative autonomy enjoyed by state institutions, especially
state legislatures, when they carry out their duties. It would be
tempting to connect the dots from all these cases and derive a
general principle of legislative autonomy and immunity from
coercion and conscription. In the end, however, I think the stateconscription cases involve a very different situation-that of the
federal government coercing state legislatures-from the scarletletter-device cases. When the people of a state, the masters of
their legislature, if you will, engage in such coercion, no federal
constitutional value is offended. 5 Of course, Thornton and other
constitutional developments tell us that the people of each state
are not the masters of the national legislature, Congress. 6 For
that reason, although the reviewing courts have not drawn a
distinction between the two sets of government agents, scarlet
letters imposed on federal legislators may be impermissible"
even though they are quite allowable for their state counterparts. 8 I will return to the question of coercing federal legislators a bit later.
But let us begin by focusing on scarlet letters that are imposed upon state legislators. My discussion assumes that scarlet
letter devices really are, as lower courts have held them to be,
"coercive," rather than "informational." 9 Indeed, my argument is
that nothing in Article V prohibits coercive action by the people

13. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
14. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).

15. Indeed, as I suggest below, when the federal Constitution is used to interfere
with the power the people of each state enjoy to structure their state government in
ways they see fit, constitutional values of federalism are compromised. See infra
notes 102-13 and accompanying text.
16. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 806-27 (1995); infra
notes 45-66 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Gralike v. Cook, 996 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Mo. 1998).
18. To say that scarlet letters are allowable under Article V is not, of course, to
say they are wise. I express no view in this Essay on the wisdom of using scarlet
letters and other coercive measures to push along the Article V amendment process.
Nor do I express any view on the wisdom of congressional term limits.
19. Because of the crucial time at which voters would see the ballot designations-the moment at which they cast their ballots--scarlet letters are obviously
more influential than, say, political advertising. Whether they are "coercive" depends
on what we mean by that term and is a difficult, but ultimately irrelevant, question.
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of a state against its legislature. Thus, my Article V analysis
would be no different if the people of the several states, instead
of adopting a scarlet letter approach, had gone even "further" by
backing up their instructions to their state legislative contingents by imposing on those legislators who disregarded the popular directives a flat ineligibility to seek reelection.
My inquiry into these matters proceeds as follows. In Part I of
this Essay, I open the analysis of coercive measures against
state legislators by focusing on the text of Article V, particularly
its reference to "Legislatures of... the... States."20 I conclude
that the term, used against the historical backdrop of state constitutions in 1787, was not designed to interfere with the preexisting control that people enjoyed over their state legislatures. I
then reinforce this textual/historical reading with compelling
structural and practical arguments. Most importantly, I argue
that the structural concern over governmental self-dealing counsels against reading Article V as giving a veto over constitutional change to government actors.2 I conclude Part I by analyzing
other places in which the Constitution has empowered "Legislatures of... the... States" and concluding that these other
provisions of the Constitution further undermine the reading of
Article V that courts across the nation have embraced.
In Part , I explain why Article V uses the term "Legislatures
of... the... States" rather than "states," the more generic
term used elsewhere in the Constitution. In Part HI, I consider
possible counterarguments to my reading of Article V, including
some based on old Supreme Court cases and others based on
structural constitutional themes. In Part IV,I quickly dispose of
the issue bracketed above-the application of coercive measures
to federal legislators. I then conclude by suggesting that there
may be some additional constitutional questions that need to be
asked about scarlet letter and other coercive measures-questions that have nothing to do with any Article V reasoning embraced to date.2 2
20. U.S. CONST. art. V.
21. My treatment of structural considerations in this Part also includes an analysis of the "Republican Guarantee Clause." See infra notes 102-08 and accompanying

text.
22. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. These last comments are tentative
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I. WHY ARTICLE V CAN'T MEAN WHAT THEY SAY IT MEANS
A. Text and History
Article V of the Constitution has received more scholarly attention in the past few decades than ever before.2" Much of this
recent and needed' attention has focused on whether Article V
is the exclusive lawful means of federal constitutional amendment. Those who say that Article V is not the exclusive means of
amending the Constitution argue that the national polity is
sovereign under American constitutional theory, and that a
majority of this national polity enjoys the constitutional right to
amend the document through deliberative means, whether or
not these means meet the requirements of Article V.25 Those
who support the conventional view that Article V is completely
exclusive reject the idea that ultimate sovereignty resides completely in a majority of the national people. Instead, these scholars argue that Article V reflects a federalism compromise in
which people of each state surrendered some of their sovereignty
in 1787 as the price to pay for ratifying the Constitution. How-

and will be elaborated in a future essay. See Vikram David Amar & Alan
Brownstein, Scarlet Letters and Constitutional Limits on Ways to Structure Ballots
(forthcoming).
23. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution,
93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984); Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed. Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994); David R. Dow,
When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of Article V, 76 IOWA L.
REV. 1 (1990); Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People(s), Original Understanding,and
ConstitutionalAmendment, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 121 (1996).
24. I say academic attention is needed because there are so many unresolved
questions concerning Article V, see Laurence H. Tribe, Issues Raised by Requesting
Congress to Call a Constitutional Convention to Propose a Balanced Budget Amendment, 10 PAC. L.J. 627 (1979), and because Article V was invoked often-a dozen
times-during the last 90 years. Compare that to the complete absence of Article V
amendments, not counting the Reconstruction amendments (which were legally and
historically anomalous) for the 109 years between 1804 and 1913. Moreover, people
today seem to be making more and more calls to amend the Constitution. See, e.g.,
Senator Dianne Feinstein, For the Victims, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1999, at A16 (arguing in favor of proposed Victims' Rights Amendment); David E. Rosenbaum, Stars,
Stripes, Flames and Free Speech Redux, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1999, at All (discussing the perennial debate over the proposed flag-burning amendment).
25. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6-7 (1991); 2
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 15-17 (1998); Amar, supra
note 23, at 488-94.
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ever, because of mistrust of other state peoples, they did so only
on the condition that future changes to the Constitution would
comply with Article V's particular and cumbersome processes.2 6
Thus, the scholarly debate on Article V exclusivity thus far has
focused on the relationship between the national polity and state
polities, as well as the relationship between the peoples of the
various states. But the important and separate matter of the
relationship under Article V between the people of each state
and their elected legislators has received no academic attention
until this Essay. Even as I examine this last question, though, I
should note that my resolution of it is not unrelated to the way
the exclusivity question has been decided. Indeed, as I demonstrate below, the conventional reading of Article V exclusivity-embraced by most commentators as well as all courts
-counsels strongly in favor of my resolution of the question of
popular coercion. With that background, let us turn in earnest
to the popular coercion question.
Any assessment of the constitutionality under Article V of
coercion of state legislatures must, of course, consider the text of
Article V itself, which provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds
of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all
Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several
States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one
or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made
prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall
in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the
Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without

26. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 23; Tribe, supra note 24, at 632-37 (discussing
the compromise present in the Article V Convention); see also Douglas iUnder, What
in the Constitution Cannot Be Amended?, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 720 (1981) (describ-

ing some of the Framers' intentional efforts to make the amendment process difficult
in anticipation of state subversion).
27. See infra notes 71-101 and accompanying text.

1044

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1037

its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the
Senate.
Article V sets out two paths to proposing amendments, congressional proposal or a proposing convention, and two paths to
ratifying them, through state legislatures or, at Congress's election, through state conventions. Article V thus refers to 'Legislatures... of the... States," and "Conventions in... the States,"
but not-at least not explicitly-to the people of the states. 9
"Legislature," the argument against coercive measures like Proposition 225 runs, is a term of art. Use of the term "legislature"
creates a nondelegable power on the part of elected representative legislatures. "Legislatures" means legislatures, not conventions, -and certainly not the people of each state themselves.
This textual argument is expressed quite directly in the
eighty-year-old United States Supreme Court opinion in Hawke
v. Smith,3 0 a decision heavily relied upon in recent lower court
rulings"' and one that I will take up in more detail in Part
III.A.12 In Hawke, the Court invoked Article V in refusing to enforce an Ohio constitutional provision that recognized the power
of the people of Ohio to reverse, by referendum, decisions to
ratify proposed federal amendments made by the state legislature."3 In broad language, the Hawke Court observed:
What did the framers of the Constitution mean in requiring
[in Article VI ratification by "legislatures?"That was not a
term of uncertain meaning when incorporated into the Constitution. What it meant when adopted it still means for the
purpose of interpretation. A Legislature was then the representative body which made the laws of the people.... There
can be no question that the framers of the Constitution clearly
understood and carefully used the terms in which that instrument referred to the action of the Legislatures of the

28. U.S. CONST. art. V.
29. Id.
30. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).

31. See, e.g., Miller v. Moore, 169 F.3d 1119 (8th Cir. 1999); Gralike v. Cook, 996
F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Mo. 1998); Donovan v. Priest, 931 S.W.2d 119 (Ark. 1996);
Bramberg v. Jones, 978 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1999).
32. See infra notes 153-86 and accompanying text.
33. See Hawke, 253 U.S. at 227.
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States. When they intended that direct action by the people
should be had they were no less accurate in the use of apt
phraseology to carry out such purpose.34
At first glance, this textual argument has some surface plausibility. We all instinctively think, and throughout American history have thought, that there is a difference between the people
and a legislature. We also presume that the Framers of the
Constitution chose their words carefully. On more thorough reflection, however, analysis of the textual term "Legislatures
of... the... States" supports rather than undermines measures like Proposition 225. To begin with, in all the lower court
cases construing scarlet letter devices, it is the legislatures that
are coerced into doing the applying.15 The legislatures may not
like what they are being forced to do, to be sure, but they are
still the ones acting. There is an obvious sense, therefore, in
which the scarlet
letter devices comply with the text of Article V
36
completely.
This may seem too formalist for some readers, however. 7 If
the people are forcing the issue, then, in reality, it is the people
rather than the legislature making the key decisions and exercising the power. This recognition brings us to the heart of the
textual argument-the idea that as a matter of text, real power
must reside in an "independent legislature," and cannot be
transferred to someone or something else. It is at this point,
however, that the textual argument seems to go beyond the text
itself. Of course, the text does refer to state legislatures, but it
nowhere explicitly says that state legislatures means legislatures free to act according to their discretion---"independent
legislatures"--as opposed to legislatures typically guided and
even bound by their creators and masters-the state peoples.
34. Id. at 227-28.
35. See, e.g., Miller, 169 F.3d at 1119; League of Women Voters v. Gwadosky, 966
F. Supp. 52, 52 (D. Me. 1997); Donovan, 931 S.W.2d at 119; Bramberg, 978 P.2d at
1240; Morrissey v. Colorado, 951 P.2d 911, 911 (Colo. 1998); Opinion of the Justices,
673 A.2d 693, 693 (Me. 1996); In re Initiative Petition No. 364, 930 P.2d 186, 186
(Okla. 1996).
36. This is a quick and easy way to distinguish Hawke, which involved not coercing, but supplanting, the standing legislature's power. For an even better way to distinguish Hawke, see infra notes 153-86 and accompanying text.
37. It may be worth pointing out that textualism itself, taken seriously, is too
formalistic for many.
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Perhaps an analogy here will drive home the point I am making. There are a lot of interesting connections between various
structural themes of the Constitution, so let us look outside of
Article V to another structural idea: separation of powers, particularly Article II's Appointments Clause. The Appointments
Clause says: "Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 3 8
Imagine that Congress passed a law vesting appointment power
for an assistant Attorney General in the Attorney General, the
head of the Justice Department. Would anyone argue that the
President does not have the right to coerce the Attorney General,
through threats and imposition of the ultimate sanction-firing-into appointing the kind of person the President
wants as assistant Attorney General? I think not, even though
the Constitution clearly distinguishes here between the "President" and "Heads of Departments." 9 Most everyone would concede presidential power to coerce here and would not read the
reference to "Heads of Departments" to mean "independent
Heads of Departments." Indeed, at least as it relates to the head
of the Justice Department, the idea of an "independent" department head would strike most people as unthinkable. Instead,
under Article II, the President effectively gets to control the
power that the Constitution allows Congress to vest in underlings. Why? Because as a backdrop matter of executive power,
he is the underlings' master-their superior. So too, as a backdrop principle, state people are masters of their legislatures. We
therefore should not read the words of Article V as excluding
popular control, just as we do not read the words of Article II as
excluding presidential control.40
I just described popular control of state legislatures as a backdrop principle. Where does this principle come from? After all, in

38. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
39. Id.
40. One of the important reasons we do not read Article 11 to forbid presidential
control is the idea of separation of powers. The other great structural theme of the
constitutional design, federalism, similarly counsels against reading Article V to
forbid popular control. See infra notes 102-19 and accompanying text.
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the context of the unitary executive, the master/servant relationship between the President and the "Heads of Departments"
comes from our understanding of Article II and the theoretical
background against which it was enacted. My suggestion that
the people are masters of their state legislative servants also
derives from the setting against which the Founders used the
phrase "Legislatures of... the... States."
As the eminent historian Gordon S. Wood has explained, during the period between the Revolution and the framing of the
Constitution, "many Americans believed their representatives to
be... mere agents or tools of the people who could give [them]
binding directions ... ." Drawing on ideas from both the great
Whig tradition and people like Locke and Trenchard, American
leaders who shaped political rhetoric and discourse during this
period characterized the relationship between people and their
government in master/servant terms." Moreover, when it came
time to draft new state constitutions to govern the former colonies, Americans built these ideas explicitly into the text of their
new charters. The Virginia Constitution of 1776 was fairly representative of others in this regard: it opened by declaring that
"all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all
41. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at
371 (1969).
42. See id. at 363-89. Samuel Chase, for example, observed:
From the nature of government by representation, the deputies must be
subject to the will of their principals or this manifest absurdity and plain
consequence must follow, that a few men would be greater than the
whole community, and might act in opposition to the declared sense of
all their constituents.
Id. at 371 (emphasis omitted). Similarly, John Adams noted:

[Representation] is in reality nothing more than this, the people choose
attorneys to vote for them in the great council of the nation, reserving

always the fundamentals of the government, reserving also a right to
give their attorneys instructions how to vote, and a right at certain,

stated intervals, of choosing a-new; discarding an old attorney, and choosing a wiser and better.
John Adams, The Earl of Clarendon to William Pym, in THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 477, 481 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1969) (1851); see also DANIEL A. FARBER
& SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 110-11 (1990)
(quoting John Adams and discussing the idea, shared by the Framers, that the government is the servant of the people who are the true arm of government).
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times amenable to them."' As Professors Farber and Sherry
have summarized:
When the American states gained the opportunity [after the
Revolution] to create legislatures more to their liking [than
was Parliament], they implemented many of these ideas. In
1776, [John] Adams again expressed the views of many of his
compatriots when he described the ideal legislature: "It
should be in miniature an exact portrait of the people at
large. It should think, feel, reason and act like them." In
order to create such a legislature, and to check the power of
legislators, the new states uniformly established very short
terms of office. Elections for the lower house were held every
year in every state except South Carolina, where they were
held every other year....
Voters in most states also had the right to instruct their
representatives and to direct votes on individual issues.
[Four] state constitutions [explicitly] guaranteed such a right.
In the others, the right was assumed. 44

43. VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights § 2 (emphasis added), reprinted in 7 THORPE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS, CHARTERS AND ORGANIC LAWS, 1492-1908, at 3813 (1909);
MD. CONST. of 1776, art. V, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra, at 1687 ("[T]he right in
the people to participate in the Legislature is the best security of liberty, and the
foundation of all free government ... ."); MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. V, reprinted in
3 THORPE, supra, at 1890 ("All power residing originally in the people, and being
derived from them, the several magistrates and officers of government, vested with
authority, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, are their substitutes and agents,
and are at all times accountable to them."). For examples of other states, see N.H.
CONST. of 1784, art. VIII, reprinted in 4 THORPE, supra, at 2454 ("All power residing
originally in, and being derived from the people, all the magistrates and officers of
government, are their substitutes and agents, and at all times accountable to
them."); PA. CONST. of 1776, art. IV, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra, at 3082 ("That
all power being originally inherent in, and consequently derived from, the people;
therefore all officers of government, whether legislative or executive, are their trustees and servants, and at all times accountable to them."). For a good general discussion of these provisions, see John Choon Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42
EMORY L.J. 967 (1993).
44. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 42, at 111. The four states whose constitutions
contained explicit instruction language were North Carolina, see N.C. CONST. of 1776,
Declaration of Rights, art. II, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 43, at 2787; Pennsylvania, see PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XVI, reprinted in 5
THORPE, supra note 43, at 3084; Massachusetts, see MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art.
VII, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 43, at 1890; New Hampshire, see N.H.
CONST. of 1784, pt. 1, art. X, reprinted in 4 THORPE, supra note 43, at 2455. In
addition, the 1777 Constitution of Vermont, which became a state in 1791, contained
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We can see this state constitutional backdrop right to instruct
and control state legislators even more clearly when we examine
how the issues of instruction and control over the newly created
federal legislature were resolved. Shortly after the ratification of
the Constitution, Congress discussed a bill of rights package.45
During that discussion in 1789, a motion was made to include in
what would become the First Amendment a right of the people
"to instruct their representatives."4 This proposal was made in
part because Virginia, 47 New York,48 and North Carolina,49 in
ratifying the Constitution, had appended declarations of rights
-constitutional wish lists-that included a right to instruct.50
Ultimately, a congressional committee voted down the language
recognizing a right to instruct,5 ' and the bill of rights package
that was sent by Congress to the states for ratification made no
mention of instruction. 2
explicit instruction language. See VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. I, art. VI, reprinted in 6
THORPE, supra note 43, at 3740.
A number of commentators, even some who may be disinclined to my bottom
line in this Essay, have commented on the populist nature of state governments in
1787. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J.
1503, 1522-26 (1990) (arguing that the Framers designed the federal Constitution to
"filter"out the "excess of populism in the state governments"); Monaghan, supra note

23, at 140, 173 (citing THORNTON ANDERSON, CREATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE
CONVENTION OF 1787 AND THE FIRST CONGRESS 159 (1993) and quoting J. ALLEN
SMITH, THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 61-62 (Macmillan 1912) (1907) for the
proposition that "the doctrine [was] expressly recognized in some of the states and
virtually in all, that a majority of the qualified voters could amend the fundamental
law"); Catherine A. Rogers & David L. Faigman, 'And to the Republic for Which It
Stands": Guaranteeinga Republican Form of Government, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
1057, 1061-66 (1996) (arguing that the Constitution was a reaction to populism in
state government).
45. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 703 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
46. 1 id. at 733. The context of the proposal made clear it was directed specifically at Congress. Cf Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 249 (1833) (finding that
constitutional amendments afford protection from the federal government, not the
states).

47. See 3 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 660 (Ayer
1987) (1888) [hereinafter DEBATES].
48. See 1 id. at 328.
49. See 4 id. at 243.
50. See Akbil Reed Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 1043, 1059 (1988).
51. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 45, at 747.
52. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. I (illustrating that the Constitution protects the rights
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Particularly illuminating for present purposes, however, are
four important features of the debate in Congress over the proposed instruction language. First, although participants in the
congressional discussion debated whether the votes of faithless
federal legislators, that is, legislators who disobeyed their instructions, would count if the instruction language were enacted,
there was general agreement that a right to instruct connotes a
right to bind and to sanction disobedience." Second, in response
to suggestions made by opponents of instruction that such a
right had no historical basis, supporters of the right pointed
repeatedly and explicitly to the state constitutional provisions in
three important states-Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and
North Carolina-which recognized a right to instruct in a legally
binding way." Third, and related, no instruction opponent, when
confronted with the state constitutional precedents, ever once remotely suggested that these state constitutional provisions
would be limited in any way by these states having recently
ratified the Constitution.5 5 Instead, instruction opponents simply
argued against the wisdom and propriety of binding federal
legislators. 56 When they did-and this is the fourth point-they
often invoked arguments that can be used to distinguish between state and federal legislators for purposes of popular con57
trol.
Consider, in this regard, the powerful statement made by
Roger Sherman:
It appears to me, that the words [of the proposed instruction
clause] are calculated to mislead the people, by conveying an

of assembly and of petition, but does not protect the right of federal instruction).
53. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 45, at 735-46.
54. See, e.g., 1 id&at 744-45 (statements of Page and Burke).
55. Such a suggestion, if valid, would have been very relevant to the question at
hand. If state legislatures were free from instruction when performing duties created
by the federal Constitution, then no instruction of federal representatives would have
made sense, inasmuch as every one of their duties, indeed their very existence, is
owing to the federal Constitution.
One would think that if anyone believed that anything in the new Constitution-be it Article V or the Republican Guarantee Clause, see infra note 102-altered
the existing powers enjoyed by stats peoples over their legislatures, someone would
have mentioned such an important and likely controversial idea.
56. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 45, at 739 (statement of Stone).
57. See, e.g., 1 id at 735 (statement of Clymer).
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idea that they have a right to control the debates of the [national] Legislature. This cannot be- admitted to be just, because it would destroy the object of their meeting. I think,
when the people have chosen a representative, it is his duty
to meet others from the different parts of the Union, and consult, and agree with them to such acts as are for the general
benefit of the whole community.58
Thus, to Sherman, a key reason for rejecting a right to instruct federal representatives was geographical. The Republic
was founded on the idea that different states and regions would
have different information, desires, values and interests, and
that Congress was designed to be a national body to which people from all reaches of the country would come to exchange,
debate, and resolve ideas. Each congressional district or state
was a mere part of the national whole, and allowing each part of
the whole to instruct particular representatives destroyed the
very reason for having Congress "assemble" and hold "Meeting[s]" as Article I of the Constitution requires.5 9
This idea that states or districts were only "parts" of the
"whole" and could not have all the relevant information that
comes from a "meeting" with other parts of the "Union" recurs
throughout the discussion of the failed instruction language. 0
For our purposes, it also helps explain why instruction is permitted at the state but not at the federal level as a general matter of federal constitutional law. As Madison argued in Federalist 10 and 63, a truly deliberative government like the federal

58. 1 id. at 735 (emphases added).
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall assemble at least once in
every Year, and such Meeting shall be ....
. (emphases added)).
60. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 45, at 738-39 (statement of Madison); 1 id. at 742 (statement of Livermore); 1 id. at 746 (statement of Lawrence).
One scholar reflected on this idea, contrasting colonial instruction with the way
things worked in Parliament:
Instruction was but one form by which representation in the colonies was
kept "actual," a form of attorneyship, as distinct from the virtual representation celebrated in Burke's description of Parliament as "a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole, where,
not local purposes, not local prejudices ought to guide, but the general
good, resulting from the general reason of the whole."
BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERIcAN POLITIcs 84-85 (1968) (quoting Edmund

Burke's speech to the electors of Bristol in 1774).
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Congress required the "extensive territory" that made up the
new Union."1 Madison observed that geographical units with
more "narrow limits," like those "occupied by the democracies of
Greece," could not be expected to have the model of "representative government" exemplified by Congress.6 2
This distinction between the geographically expansive federal
Union and the more "narrowly limited" states was woven into
the Constitution itself. Unlike Congress, state legislatures are
not required by the federal Constitution to "assemble" or hold
"meetings." Congresspersons necessarily come from different
geographic regions; Article I requires as a qualification for Congress that candidates "be [ilnhabitant[s] of... [the] State[s]" in
which they are elected.6" By contrast, there is no federal constitutional requirement that state legislatures be selected from
separate geographical districts within the state; certainly, a
state could choose to elect all its legislators through an at-large
system.64 Moreover, the division of geopolitical authority among
political subdivisions within a state is purely a matter of state
law. 65 As far as the federal Constitution is concerned, the state
is the smallest part of the national whole-it is the constitutional quark. It is for these reasons that John Adams understood
intuitively that federal instruction posed different issues than
state legislative instruction:
Upon principle, I see no right in our Senate and House to
dictate, nor to advise, nor to request our representatives in
Congress. The right of the people to instruct their representatives, is very dear to them, and will never be disputed by me.
But this [federal instruction] is a very different thing from an
interference of a State legislature.'
61. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 63 (James Madison).
62. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 387 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
64. I argue below that the Constitution does not even mandate that state legislative representative bodies exist in any form. Even if I am wrong about this, however, there is no plausible argument that state legislatures must mirror Congress.
65. See, e.g., Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907) (observing that

states may delegate or withdraw power to local government in their "absolute discretion.... In all these respects the State is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any
provision of the Constitution of the United States").
66. John Adams, Letter to J.B. Varnum, in 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADABIS, supra
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Given this historical backdrop of state legislative instruction,
the textual argument from Article V against coercion of state
legislatures looks more questionable. If the Hawke Court was
correct that the term "Legislature" was "not a term of uncertain
meaning" 7 at the founding, that meaning cuts in favor of, and
not against, popular coercion of state legislatures. To put my
point another way, as a matter of text, Article V should take
"legislatures of the states" as it finds them-subject to control by
the people of the states.6" Indeed, it is not uncommon to find
discussions throughout the framing period in which the term
"legislature" is used interchangeably with "people." For example,
in describing the essence of republican government, Charles
Pinckney in the South Carolina ratifying convention explained
that a "republic [is a form of government] where the people at
large, either collectively or by representation,form the legislature." 9 I do not mean to argue, of course, that the Framers did
not understand that there was an observable difference between
the people acting directly and through a legislative body.70 Instead, as Pinckney's words illustrate, what I am suggesting is
that a dominant mode of thought regarding the state governments in effect before ratification viewed legislatures as merely
alter egos of the people.
B. Structural Considerations
If the textual/historical argument against reading the phrase
"legislature" to mean "independent legislature" were not persuanote 42, at 604, 605.
67. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920).
68. The Constitution incorporates other terms whose meaning is defined under
state law. For example, the term "property" in the Fifth Amendment is defined by
reference to expectations arising from state law. For a discussion of the Constitution's incorporation of terms defined under state law, see Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 575-78 (1972); Vikram David Amar, Indirect Effects of Direct

Election: A Structural Examination of the Seventeenth Amendment, 49 VAND. L. REV.
1347, 1366-71 (1996).
69. 4 DEBATES, supra note 47, at 328.

70. Indeed, as we will see, there is a big difference in that legislatures may act
selfishly, and, for that reason, need to be monitored by the people. See infra notes
72-101 and accompanying text.
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sive enough, there are compelling structural and pragmatic
reasons as well.7 ' Most importantly, denying the right of the
people to coerce state legislatures would require us to readArticle V to give ordinarygovernment complete control over changing
ordinary government. Such a reading is impossible to square
with the pervasive fear the Framers expressed about government self-dealing and the right of the people to respond to such
self-dealing by altering their form of government.
1. PopularSovereignty and the Agency Problem
The Constitution was founded on the legitimate power, or
sovereignty, of the people. This sovereignty meant first and
foremost that the people created government, not vice versa, and
that the people could therefore change government when appropriate. Throughout the debate over whether to alter America's
basic government by ratifying the Constitution, both proratification federalists and antiratification antifederalists built their
arguments on this "transcendent and precious right of the people to 'abolish or alter their governments as to them shall seem
most likely to effect their safety and happiness ....'"' As James
Madison put the point to the delegates at Philadelphia, "[tihe
people were in fact, the fountain of all power, and by resorting to
them, all difficulties were got over. They could alter constitutions
as they pleased."3
Indeed, the whole idea of building an amendment process into
the Constitution derived from a concern that the people would
need to reclaim some of the power they had delegated to their
everyday government agents in an orderly way. As James
Iredell, who would later serve with distinction on the Supreme
Court, explained at the North Carolina ratifying convention:
71. Of course, the structural arguments I present below are independent of each
other, and of the textual/historical arguments I presented above. One could embrace
any or all of them to agree with my conclusion.
72. THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 253 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)).
73. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 476 (Max Farrand
ed., 1937) [hereinafter RECORDS] (statement of Madison) (emphasis added); see also 4
DEBATES, supra note 47, at 230 ("The same authority that created can destroy; and
" (statement of James
the people may undoubtedly change the government ....
Iredell) (emphasis added)).
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[In America] tumultuous proceedings are as unnecessary as
they would be improper and ineffectual. Other means are in
our hands, as much preferable as good order is to confusion... [Whenever the people want to change their constitution], it is entirely within their power to effect it without the
slightest disturbance.7 4
What is more, among leading federalists and antifederalists
alike, it was well understood that such constitutional change
often would be necessitated by government officials who abused
their power. Indeed, concern about what economists today call
"agency costs" was one of the most dominant themes running
through political discussion in the 1780s.75 In Federalist 63,
Madison succinctly distilled the concern in very simple but powerful terms: "The people can never willfully betray their own
interests; but they may possibly be betrayed by the representa76 Linking together all these ideas of
tives of the people ...
popular sovereignty, betrayal by government agents, and the
need for an amendment process, Edmund Pendleton told the
Virginia Ratifying Convention over which he presided:
We, the people, possessing all power, form a government,
such as we think will secure happiness: and suppose, in
adopting this plan, we should be mistaken in the end; where
is the cause of alarm on that quarter? In the same plan we
point out an easy and quiet method of reforming what may
be found amiss. No, but, say gentlemen, we have put the
introduction of that method in the hands of our servants, who
will interrupt it from motives of self-interest. What then? ...

74. 4 DEBATES, supra note 47, at 232.

75. As many other constitutional scholars have demonstrated, this concern about
abusive and disloyal government agents animated much of structure of the original
Constitution, and a great deal of the Bill of Rights as well. See, e.g., AXHIL REED
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1998).
76. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 386 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961);
see also THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray
the interests of the people."). This is why, for example, state legislatures-which
were not to be trusted--could not ratify the original Constitution. Instead, the people
themselves had to ratify the original Constitution in special conventions. See infra
notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
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Who shall dare to resist the people? No, we will assemble in
Convention; wholly recall our delegated powers, or reform
them so as to prevent such abuse; and punish those servants
who have perverted powers, designed for our happiness, to
their own emolument."
When the time came to spell out a particular amendment
procedure in Article V, no concern weighed more heavily on the
minds of the drafters than government selfishness. An early
version of what became Article V was roundly rejected because it
vested amendment authority in Congress alone, giving the national legislature in essence a veto over constitutional change:
"It would be improper to require the consent of the [National]
Legislature, because they may abuse their power, and refuse
their consent on that very account. The opportunity for such an
abuse, may be the fault of the Constitution calling for
amendm[en]t." 8
As Walter Dellinger wrote twenty years ago, this theme-Congress ought not to have control over amendment process lest the
process be used to retain and aggrandize Congress's own powers-is one of the few that emerges quite clearly from the proceedings. 9
But concerns about self-dealing were not limited to Congress.
Just as those who crafted Article V explicitly rejected a congressional block on changing the Constitution, so too they explicitly
rejected giving state governments a veto.8 0 Responding to another early version of Article V that gave proposal power directly to
the legislatures of the states and not to Congress, Alexander
Hamilton objected: "The State legislatures will not apply for
alterations but with a view to increase their own powers.""1 This
concern was a serious one-so serious that the final version of
77. 3 DEBATES, supra note 47, at 37.
78. 1 RECORDS, supra note 73, at 203 (statement of Mason); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[It has
been urged that the persons delegated to the administration of the national government will always be disinclined to yield up any portion of the authority of which
they were once possessed."); Walter E. Dellinger, The Recurring Question of the
"Limited" Constitutional Convention, 88 YALE L.J. 1623, 1626, 1630 (1979).
79. See Dellinger, supra note 78, at 1630.
80. See id. at 1626-28.
81. 2 RECORDS, supra note 73, at 558.
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Article V not only denied state legislatures exclusive authority
to propose amendments, but also allowed Congress to cut state
legislatures out of the ratification process.8 2 Moreover, the final
version denied state legislatures any power to propose amendments at all, instead giving states only the power to call for a
national convention. 3 Professor Dellinger has observed that this
proposing convention was attractive to the Framers because it
was a "national body." ' It seems quite natural that it was attractive also because it was a nongovernmental body, and thus
was not prone to the selfishness of ordinary government.
So those crafting and discussing Article V in 1787 were worried Congress would act selfishly, and that state legislatures
would act selfishly. Were they also worried about Congress and
the state legislatures acting selfishly at once? The antifederalists
certainly were. Consider, for example, the analysis of Article V
by the FederalFarmerin October, 1787:
While power is in the hands of the people, or democratic part
of the community, more especially as at present, it is easy,
according to the general course of human affairs, for the few
influential men in the community, to obtain conventions,
alterations in government, and to persuade the common people they may change for the better .... But when power is
once transferred from the many to the few, all changes become extremely difficult; the government, in this case, being
beneficial to the few, they will be exceedingly artful and
adroit in preventing any measures which may lead to a
change; and nothing will produce it, but great exertions and
severe struggles on the part of the common people.'
The Federalists responded to charges like these by denying the
characterization of Article V as entrenching government. and
aristocratic interests. Quite telling are the remarks Rufus King
made at the Massachusetts ratifying convention, three months
after the Farmer'sremarks:

82. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
83. See Dellinger, supra note 78, at 1632.

84. Id.
85. Letters from the Federal Farmer (V) (Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in 4 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 579 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
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[Miany of the arguments of [constitutional opponents are]
founded on the idea of future amendments being impracticable. [I]callI[ upon [these] gentlemen to produce an instance,
in any other national constitution, where the people had so
fair an opportunity to correct any abuse which might take
place in the future administration of the government under
6
8

it.

James Iredell was perhaps most thorough in responding to
criticisms of Article V, in his statements to the North Carolina
ratifying convention:
The Constitution before us, if it be adopted, can be altered
with as much regularity, and as little confusion, as any act of
[any] Assembly .... [Alterations can without difficulty be
made, agreeable to the general sense of the people. Let us
attend to the manner in which amendments may be made.
The proposition for amendments may arise from Congress
itself, when two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary. If they should not, and yet amendments be generally
wished for by the people, two thirds of the legislatures of the
different states may require a general convention for the purpose, in which case Congress [sic] are under the necessity of
convening one. Any amendments which either Congress shall
propose, or which shall be proposed by such general convention, are afterwards to be submitted to the legislatures of the
different states, or conventions called for that purpose, as
Congress shall think proper.... By referring this business to
the legislatures, expense would be saved; and in general, it
may be presumed, [that] they would speak the genuine sense
of the people. It may, however, on some occasions, be better to
consult an immediate delegationfor that specialpurpose. This
87
is therefore left discretionary.
Iredell's passage is telling. The goal of the Article V amendment
process is to obtain amendments "agreeable to the general sense

86. 2 DEBATES, supra note 47, at 116 (statement of King) (emphasis added); see
also 2 id. (stating that there is no other government 'in which such a wise precaution has been taken to secure to the people the right of making such alterations and
amendments, in a peaceable way, as experience shall have proved to be necessary"
(statement of Jarvis) (emphasis added)).
87. 4 DEBATES, supra note 47, at 177 (statement of Iredell) (emphases added).
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of the people," those that are "generally wished for by the people," and those that reflect a "genuine sense of the people."8 8
Indeed, Iredell is explicit that if Congress fails to propose an
amendment that is wished for "by the people," the state legislative call for a proposing convention is the cure. 9 And while
Iredell's reference to congressional "flexibility" to circumvent
self-interest on the part of state legislatures specifically relates
to ratification, the concern underlying the "flexibility" applies to
calls for a proposing convention as well. 90
It is true, of course, that the Framers probably anticipated
that a healthy competition between state and federal governments would ensue, with each helping to keep selfishness on the
part of the other in check.9 1 This competition may have grown
less intense over the decades, partly because through federal
funding the federal government may have "tamed" state governments. Rotation of individuals from state to federal office also
may have broken down the competition.
But surely the Framers appreciated in 1787 that even with
fierce competition, certain kinds of potential federal amendments could tempt all levels of government to betray the wishes
and interests of the people. Liability of government officials for
constitutional torts is one example. Pay raises for government

88. 4 id89. 4 id.
90. Nor would it be a good argument to suggest that the inclusion of the ratifying
convention route means the Framers assumed that the "legislature" route would
involve legislative independence. Not all states had an explicit right to instruct, and
although the people of each state retained the right to amend their state constitution to include such a device for control, the Framers quite sensibly did not want to
rely on the people of each state doing so at the ratification stage. I suppose the
Framers could have invoked the idea of state proposing conventions, but such proposing conventions probably were not mentioned for two reasons. First, time may not
be of the essence at the proposing stage as it is at the ratification stage, and thus
the control the people of each state enjoyed over their legislatures would suffice.
Second, the Framers had no direct experience with state proposing conventions when
it came to the federal Constitution. Instead, they had experience with a national
proposing convention, which of course took place in Philadelphia, and ratifying conventions in each state. I should note also that there may be additional reasons for
having conventions that go beyond the need to circumvent state legislative self-interest.
91. For a discussion of the "competition" view of federalism, see infra notes 208-22
and accompanying text.
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officials is another because pay scales for one level of government often are used as reference points for determining fair pay
for other levels. Term limits is yet a third example, for similar
reasons: The success of term limits at one level of government
may embolden and empower proponents of term limits at other
levels. It would be bizarre to think the Framers would not be
concerned with these kinds of possibilities and would want to
give ordinary government officials a monopoly on constitutional
change in these areas. Although federal antitrust laws were not
yet enacted, certainly the founding generation appreciated that
competitive organizations often conspire and collude with each
other for the greater goal of rent seeking.92
It is important to note that elections for government officials
do not solve the problem. Such elections, unlike debate over a
potential constitutional amendment, are not focused on a single
issue. Therefore, for example, even if an overwhelming majority
of voters in a state embraced federal term limits and did not like
the fact that their state legislature refused to apply for a constitutional convention, voters in each state legislative district
would have to weigh that discontent along with a number of
other policy preferences in deciding whether to punish their
state representative. Worse still, because punishing an incumbent could cause voters in a state district to perhaps lose legislative seniority unless voters in other districts all across the state
were engaged in similar punishment, a "prisoners' dilemma"
makes regular elections even less useful.9 3
Let me be clear: Those who framed and ratified Article V no
doubt expected that state legislatures would exist and that most
of the time the people of each state would give their representative body some slack to consider federal constitutional amend-

92. Cf A.C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Constitutions and Spontaneous Orders:
A Response to Professor McGinnis, 77 N.C. L. REV. 537, 539 (1999) (indicating that
"state and federal government actors [often times] seek to collude over the allocation
of authority and revenues, maximizing each level's ability to distribute rent seeking
opportunities").
93. This is where devices like scarlet letters come into play, because they make it
more likely that voters in other districts will punish unresponsive incumbents there.
For a lengthier discussion of prisoners' dilemmas in the term limits context, see
Akhil Reed Amar & Vik Amar, President Quayle?, 78 VA. L. REV. 913, 928-29
(1992).
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ments. Expecting some slack and mandating that such slack
exist as a federal constitutional matter, however, are very different things. And whether we judge the matter from the perspective of the founding or now, the essential concern about governmental self-dealing argues overwhelmingly against an interpretation that gives government an absolute block on changing
government-particularly when it comes to something like term
limits.
All of this is especially true because the Supreme Court,94 as
well as the lower courts that have struck down scarlet letters,9 5
view Article V as the exclusive means to amending the Constitution. All the rhetoric quoted above about the right of the people,
as distinguished from government agents, to change their form
of government must mean something, and if it does not mean
amendment outside of Article V,96 then it must mean the right of
popular decision making within the confines of Article V.97 Be-

94. See, e.g., U.S. Term Lihnits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 837-38 (1995)
(holding that Article V is the exclusive means of imposing congressional term limits).
95. See, e.g., Miller v. Moore, 169 F.3d 1119, 1123 (8th Cir. 1999) ("The U.S. Constitution provides ... exclusive means for its own amendment."); Donovan v. Priest,
931 S.W.2d 119, 128 (Ark. 1996) ("Article V of the United States Constitution [requires] that all proposals of amendments to that Constitution" come exclusively
through the Article V processes); Bramberg v. Jones, 978 P.2d 1240, 1247 (Cal.
1999) ("The United States Supreme Court has held that the means for amending the
federal Constitution set forth in Article V are exclusive and may not be modified by
state law.").
96. Of course, there are strong arguments that support the legality of a non-Article V amendment process. For the foreseeable future, however, courts are unlikely to
embrace these arguments. A good survey and discussion of these arguments is found
in Amar, supra note 23.
97. Some, including Henry Monaghan, have read the rhetoric about the "people's"
right to alter and abolish as a "source of political authority" rather than a "mode of
exercise." Monaghan, supra note 23, at 129, 164-72. If I understand him correctly,
what he suggests is that the people need not have any actual power, so long as
those representatives who exercise power can trace their election to the people.
Whether or not this is a plausible reading of the rights of the people of the United
States to alter and abolish, it is completely unpersuasive as applied to the state
peoples. This is so because, as Monaghan himself points out, state constitutions in
1787 implemented popular sovereignty operationally, giving voters the rights of instruction and state constitutional amendment. See id. at 172. Thus, at least at the
state level, the popular sovereignty rhetoric was understood as more than a theory
about political authority. For this reason, Monaghan and others who defend Article
V exclusivity would do better to argue that Article V exclusivity is consistent with
the right of the people to alter and abolish precisely because the people of each
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cause we have explicitly rejected a Constitution that allows for
popular control of Congress," Article V's reference to state legislatures is the only place for that popular control to be incorporated into the system to initiate constitutional change. The mere
likelihood that regular elections for government officials will, in
most cases, enable the people to effect constitutional change is
simply not enough. The theoretical (or not so theoretical) possibility that newly elected legislature after newly elected legislature might decide, upon taking office, that the proposed constitutional amendment platform on which they ran and got elected
is no longer such a good idea 99 is impossible to square with the
absolute right the people have to alter their form of government
under our Constitution. 100
In pondering these points, we would do well to keep in mind
Justice Story's description of Article V as a "safety valve" in his
famous Commentaries:
In regard to the constitution of the United States, it is confessedly a new experiment... Its framers were not bold or
rash enough to believe, or to pronounce, it to be perfect....
state can control their state legislatures. In other words, exclusivity proponents
should embrace-and not resist-my thesis here because it helps them resolve an
otherwise thorny problem.
98. See supra notes 46-66 and accompanying text.
99. George Nethercutt, a Republican representative from Washington, famously defeated then-Speaker of the House Tom Foley after pledging to serve only three
terms. The popular media recently has berated Nethercutt for breaking his promise
and deciding to run for a fourth term. See, e.g., Robert T. Nelson, Nethercutt Haunted by Term Vow, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 12, 1999, at B1, available in LEXIS, News
Library, MAJPAP File; Sam Howe Verhovek, Some Backtracking on Term Limits,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1999, at A20; Edward Walsh, Term-Limit Pledges Are Coming
Due: Some Advocates May Run Again, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 1999, at Al; George F.
Will, Terms Unlimited, WASH. POST, June 24, 1999, at A27.
100. Perhaps my point here can be seen more easily by considering the four analytic options from which we have to choose when it comes to Article V: (1) the people control neither Congress nor the state legislatures; (2) the people control both
Congress and the state legislatures; (3) the people control Congress and not the
state legislatures; or (4) the people control the state legislatures and not Congress.
The first is inconsistent with the idea of popular sovereignty to alter the Constitution-a right the Framers repeatedly asserted as foundational. See supra notes 72-77
and accompanying text. The third is implausible in light of the historical record. Our
choice is then between the second and the fourth. Given the history and structure of
the document, the fourth seems best. Even if one were to embrace the second, however, the recent scarlet letter cases would still be decided wrongly.

2000]

THE PEOPLE MADE ME DO IT

1063

[Tihey knew, that time might develope many defects in its
arrangements, and many deficiencies in its powers.... They
knew the pride and jealousy of state power in confederacies;
and they wished to disarm them of their potency.... They
believed that the power of amendment was, if one may so
say, the safety valve to let off all temporary effervescences
and excitements; and the real effective instrument to control
and adjust the movements of the machinery, when out of
order, or in danger of self-destruction. 1
2. Federalismand the "What If No State Legislature Exists?"
Problem
The argument against popular control of legislatures in Article V becomes even less plausible when we move from the theoretical level to the practical. What if a state did not have a legislature? To be sure, the Framers expected state legislatures to
exist in roughly the same form we know them today, just as
they expected Article II executive department heads to exist.
The Constitution, however, does not require either.
The only contrary argument imaginable would be based on the
so-called Republican Guarantee Clause of Article V. 1 °2 Like
other scholars who recently have written on that Clause, I do
not read it as requiring representation. The term "republic" was
used throughout the founding era most often as a synonym for
majoritarian democracy, and not for representative government.10 3 The clause certainly was designed to preserve forms of
state government that existed at the framing, which necessarily
included the right of the people to instruct."° Moreover, the

101. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 1822 (New York, Da Capo Press 1833).
102. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government .... ").
103. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 749 (1994); William T. Mayton, Direct Democracy, Federalism and the
Guarantee Clause, 2 GREEN BAG 2D 269 (1999). These two pieces collect historical
evidence to refute the argument some have made, based on language in Federalist
Number 10, that a "republican guarantee" necessarily means representative filters.
104. See Mayton, supra note 103, at 270-72. If the Republican Guarantee Clause
called into question any aspect of existing state constitutions in 1787, certainly this
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clause was intended to allow states to "experiment by altering
these forms,... [s]ubject only to the condition that these choices

and experiments remain within the zone of popular sovereignty."" 5
Hamilton put the point this way in Federalist21: "[The Clause]
could be no impediment to reforms of the State constitutions by
a majority of the people in a legal and peaceable mode. This
right would remain undiminished. The guaranty could only
operate against changes to be effected by violence.""°6 Indeed,
the power the people of a state have to structure their own government organizations and agendas in different ways, and to
experiment to find the structure that best accomplishes liberty
and happiness, is a central tenet of federalism that explains a
great number of important federalism decisions over the decades.1 °7 As Laurence Tribe has suggested, "the real business of
preserving federalism [is] protecting
the structure of state gov08
ernment from federal intrusion."

would have been a major point of discussion and controversy.
105. Id. at 271.
106. THE FEDERALIST No. 21, at 140 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).

107. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Coyle v. Smith, 221
U.S. 559 (1911) (upholding a 1910 Oklahoma law moving the state capital to Oklahoma City despite a federal law purporting to condition Oklahoma's admission to the
Union on a proviso that the state capital remain at Guthrie until 1913). New York
is discussed infra notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
108. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 918 (3d ed. 2000). For
those persons who might be inclined to think the Republican Guarantee Clause in

any way prohibits popular coercion of state legislatures, two additional points warrant mention. First, virtually no one argues that all direct democracy is unconstitutional, so that a distinction between exercise of the initiative power generally and
popular coercion must be found. If one is found, perhaps because exercise of the
initiative power, like permissible federal preemption, does not offend state legislatures in the way coercion does, there is a second problem: Popular coercion of state
legislatures does not, most people would think, raise a federal constitutional problem
when state legislatures are coerced in matters of state law alone. For example, the
people of a state can, by initiative, constitutionally force their state legislature to
produce a state budget on time by depriving legislators of pay after a certain date if
they have not enacted a state spending plan. For purposes of the Republican Guarantee Clause, however, why would this coercion be any different than coercion in the
context of Article V? If the answer is that Article V uses the phrase "legislature,"
then the Republican Guarantee Clause has added nothing to the discussion, and we
are left with the historical understanding of the word "legislature" I described a bit
earlier.
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But if we interpreted the word "legislature" in Article V to
exclude people, then a state that chose to experiment by not
having a legislature for some period of time would be denied its
say on federal constitutional amendments. The Ohio Supreme
Court pointed out over eighty years ago that this would be an
odd dilemma indeed:
[Tihat each state has the sole and paramount right to determine what its Legislature shall be cannot now be disputed. It
is [a] matter of common knowledge that there is too much
petty continuous disturbance of state laws by the various
General Assemblies of the several states. Too many laws are
enacted, amended, and repealed without rhyme orreason ....
Suppose some one were to propose and the people were to
pass an amendment to the state Constitution providing for
the abolition of the General Assembly for a period of ten
years, during which time all laws should be proposed and
enacted by the people of the state through the initiative and
referendum.... [DIuring such period [would] the state 0 be
powerless to either favor or reject a proposed amendment to
the national Constitution, because it had no General Assembly[?] Such an absurd situation disqualifying a state from
passing upon proposed amendments to the national constitution surely was never contemplated. 1°9
A possible rejoinder might be: "Well, there is no requirement
of a legislature, but if the people of a state choose to have one,
federal amendment is one thing they have got to give to it-a
nondiscrimination requirement of sorts." There is some language
in the most-cited United States Supreme Court case in the area,
Hawke v. Smith, that supports this view.11 In refusing to give
effect to the Ohio constitutional provision that authorized the
people of Ohio to annul by referendum a ratification of a federal
amendment effected by the legislature, the Court did observe
that Ohio, while retaining a referendum, had chosen to give
most legislative powers to a state legislature.' However, it is
hard to understand a nondiscrimination principle in terms of
109.
ring),
110.
111.

Hawke v. Smith, 126 N.E. 400, 403-04 (Ohio 1919) (Wanamanker, J., concuroverruled by 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
See Hawke, 253 U.S. at 230-31.
See id. at 228-29.
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any underlying constitutional values that might be at work."
Moreover, such a principle would require the difficult if not
impossible task of determining whether a state really had a
legislature. In other words, how "general" does a body's legislative powers have to be in order that it qualify as a legislature?
What if a state creates a number of lawmaking bodies, and reserves to its people the most important lawmaking function?
Does it have to assign Article V duties to one of its representative bodies? If so, which one?"'
3. The "What About Recall Efforts?" Problem
Yet another line-drawing problem arises when we consider
how far courts are willing to push their rule against coercion of
state legislatures. In particular, consider that many state constitutions explicitly provide the people of each of those states with
the power to recall their elected representatives before the next
regularly scheduled election." 4 Imagine that the people of a
state exercised the power to remove some or all of a state legislature because the legislature failed to take some action-either
calling for a convention or ratifying a pending proposal-concerning a federal constitutional amendment. Could a court, in
the name of Article V legislative independence, enjoin such a
recall effort?" 5 If not, imagine further that the people of the
state then replaced the vanquished legislature with one that
promptly followed the people's will by calling for the convention
112. If either of the two values analyzed in Part III, see infra notes 208-34 and accompanying text-filtration or preservation of states' rights-were at work, a nondiscrimination norm would seem underprotective as to its goal.
113. The language of the Ohio Supreme Court opinion in Hawke v. Smith is provocative here: "The Constitution of Ohio nowhere uses the word 'legislature,' and if
the strict letter of the law be applied, Ohio has no Legislature in the strict and
technical sense. Its Legislature is a 'General Assembly' plus the referendum in the
hands of the people." Hawke, 126 N.E. at 404 (Wanamaker, J., concurring).
114. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. II, § 13; COLO. CONST. art. XXI, § 1; GA. CONST.
art. 2, § 2, para. 4; MICH. CONST. art. II, § 8; see also supra note 43 (expanding on
the theme of legislative accountability to the electorate as enunciated in various
state constitutions).
115. The Court has held that at least some cases raising questions under the Article V ratification process are justiciable. See Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of
Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386,
390-403 (1983).
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or ratifying the proposed amendment. Do the actions of the second legislature count, or are they nullified by improper control
over Article V processes by the people?116 If the second legislature's actions count, how do we distinguish actual recall
removal from instruction with the threat of removal?
To consider these questions, perhaps it would help to take a
broader view. We would all concede that state voters are free to
take the state legislature's stance on federal amendment(s) into
account when making decisions at regular elections, just as
people could for federal congresspersons at federal elections. Yet,
if election awareness is permissible, why are instruction and
recall not? A quick answer might lie in the distinction we draw
between election awareness on the one hand, and instruction
and recall on the other, in the congressional context; why not
draw the same distinction as to state legislatures? My response
is one I have already given above: Federal agents are intended
to deliberate nationally, whereas state entities are not.1 7 That is
why the people of a state can instruct state legislatures, but not
their federal representatives, on ordinary legislative matters.
To see the point from another angle, consider that the time
frame for congressional elections is spelled out expressly in the
Constitution1 18 and cannot be shortened by the people of any
state. By contrast, the time frame for state legislative elections
is not prescribed by the federal Constitution, and therefore state
elections can be very frequent. Indeed, at the founding, they
were often yearly." 9 Suppose technology improves such that a
state chooses to hold its "regular" elections four times a year,
and the people of the state use these regular elections to impose
their will across the board, including in the federal amendment
context. Would anyone say that Article V is violated?

116. I am assuming, of course, that a court could discern the actual intent of the
electorate here. Cf Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (invalidating an initiative measure because of the intent of the voters).
117. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
118. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 ("The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year . .. ."); id. § 3, cl. 1 ("The Senate of
the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen ..
for six Years.").
119. See, e.g., FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 42, at 111-12; WOOD, supra note 41,

at 166-67.
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C. Other Settings in Which the Phrase "Legislature"Has Been
Used
1. Senate Elections
Sometimes interpretation of a phrase in the Constitution
benefits from a comparison of how similar language elsewhere in
the document has been understood. "Legislatures ...

of the ...

States" are authorized by the Constitution to do a variety of
things, and although I do not pretend to touch on every place in
the Constitution that might be compared to Article V, a few
specific provisions deserve some attention. Most important are
the provisions in Article I regarding the election of United
States Senators.
The original Constitution, before passage of the Seventeenth
Amendment in 1913, provided in Article I, Section 3 that the
"Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators
from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof .... . 0 Like
Article V, Article I, Section 3 textually makes the state legislatures the actors; it is the "Legislature[s] thereof," and not the
"states" more generally, that shall do the "cho[osing]." 1
For the purposes of this discussion, I need not fully engage
the question whether, as an originalist matter, "legislatureP in
Article I, Section 3 was intended to mean "independent legislature."' Whether they were guaranteed it by the Constitution or

120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1.
121. Id. Compare this language with Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, providing that
"[elach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct,
[the state's electoral college] Electors." Id. art. H, § 2, c. 2 (emphases added). Although Article II uses the term "legislature," it is not terribly relevant to my inquiry

because the subject of the sentence is the State itself. In any event, there is no instance in which the people of a state have tried to coerce its state legislature to

pick the presidential electors who are most popular with the electorate; such a move
has been unnecessary, because by 1820 most states, and by 1865 all states, provided
by statute for popular election of presidential electors. For further discussion, see
Amar & Amar, supra note 93.

122. There may be some originalist support for this. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No.
45, at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The Senate will be elected

absolutely and exclusively by the State legislatures."). There is evidence cutting the
other way, however, so it is not clear that Article I, as originally written, did more

than authorize, as opposed to mandate, states to delegate United States Senator
selection to standing legislatures.
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not, state legislatures did enjoy independence in selecting their
preferred persons for the Senate for the first one hundred years
of the Republic.m But by the late nineteenth century, some
years before the formal enactment of the Seventeenth Amendment providing for direct
election,m4 state legislative indepen125
down.
broken
dence had
Throughout the 1890s and early 1900s, the people of various
states were devising more or less effective means of limiting
126
state legislators' discretion in their choice of federal senators.
What evolved into the most sophisticated approach, the so-called
Oregon Plan (or Scheme), began simply enough: State legislative
candidates in Oregon were given the opportunity to formally
pledge to follow the will of the voters, as expressed through an
advisory election, when it came time to pick the next federal
senator. 7 Initially, the pledges were moral only.1 8 As other
states began to follow Oregon's lead, however, more creative and
coercive devices were employed. Nebraska, in fact, pioneered
precisely the kind of scarlet letter system under attack today. 9
Other states followed suit, crafting variations on the Oregon and
Nebraska devices to suit their local needs.' Ultimately, Oregon

123. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 42, at 340; C.H. HOEBKE, THE ROAD TO

MASS DEMOCRACY 16-17, 84-85 (1995).
124. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six
years ...

.).

125. Several Commentators, have written about these events at some length. See
Amar, supra note 68; Ronald D. Rotunda, The Aftermath of Thornton, 13 CONsT.
COMMENTARY 201 (1996); Roger G. Brooks, Comment, Garcia, The Seventeenth
Amendment, and the Role of the Supreme Court in Defending Federalism, 10 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POLY 189 (1987); Kris W. Kobach, Note, Rethinking Article V: Term
Limits and the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments, 103 YALE L.J. 1971 (1994).
Rather than trudge through the details in this Essay, I will summarize quickly the
historical developments and trust that interested readers will explore other more
historical accounts. For the most thorough of these accounts, see GEORGE H.
HAYNES, THE ELECTION OF SENATORS (1906).

126. See Rotunda, supra note 125, at 206-09.
127. See HAYNES, supra note 125, at 101; Rotunda, supra note 128, at 208-09.
128. See Rotunda, supra note 125, at 208-09.
129. See HAYNES, supra note 125, at 103 (quoting Nebraska Laws § 253); Rotunda,
supra note 125, at 209.
130. See Rotunda, supra note 125, at 209; Kobach, supra note 125, at 1978-79 &
n.33.
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voters enacted a state constitutional amendment that, as a matter of state law, bound state legislators to select the United
States Senate candidates who were most popular among state
voters. 131 By 1912, when the Senate approved the Seventeenth
Amendment, nearly sixty percent of the senators were already
selected by virtual direct election." 2
Of course, the Nebraska scarlet letters and the Oregon constitutional provision binding state legislators, as well as all the
copycat measures from other states, were never litigated in the
United States Supreme Court,"8 or lower courts for that matter.
That fact in itself may be telling. Moreover, any challenge to the
Oregon and Nebraska devices would have been difficult. If the
Oregon and Nebraska models were unconstitutional, that would
mean that all the senators elected from all the states that employed such devices for over a decade were illegitimate. The Supreme Court Justices and lower federal court judges who were
confirmed by these tainted senators were therefore also illegitimate in some sense. Putting to one side the obvious point that

131. See Brooks, supra note 125, at 208.
132. See Rotunda, supra note 125, at 208-09.
133. The Supreme Court in Hawke, seven years after the enactment of the Seventeenth Amendment, observed that:
It was never suggested, so far as we are aware, that the purpose of
making the office of Senator elective by the people could be accomplished
by a referendum vote. The necessity of the [Seventeenth] amendment to
accomplish the purpose of popular election is shown in the adoption of
the amendment.
Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 228 (1920). A determination in 1920 that the Oregon
Plan was unconstitutional would have sent shock waves through the country. Moreover, here (as elsewhere), the Hawke Court's reasoning is flawed. The Seventeenth
Amendment could have been enacted to clarify the people's (preexisting) power to
elect Senators. Clauses in the Constitution often are inserted for this clarifying effect. See Akhil Reed Amar, Constitutional Redundancies and Clarifying Clauses, 33
VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 2-7 (1998) [hereinafter Amar, Constitutional Redundancies] (discussing the idea of redundancy as a tool for clarification). Moreover, the Seventeenth
Amendment could merely have changed the "default rule" from legislative to popular
election, even though the people of the state had always enjoyed the right to change
the earlier default rule on their own.
I myself have at times made the same error of logic committed by the Hawke
Court here. See Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political ParticipationAkin to
Voting, 80 CoRNELL L. REV. 203, 223 (1995) [hereinafter Amar, Jury Service] (agreeing mistakenly with Justice Harlan's reasoning that enactment of the Fifteenth
Amendment by itself shows that voting was not covered by the Fourteenth Amendment).
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there would be no judicial remedy for such illegality, I have a
tough time envisioning anyone in any of the three branches of
the federal government concluding that the entire federal regime
was ultra vires in this way for over a decade. Thus, this history
may be strong historical support for modern scarlet letter proponents. 13
2. Other Uses of Similar Language
Two other places in the Constitution where "state legislatures" are empowered warrant discussion. Article I, Section 4
allows the "Legislature" of each state to "prescribe" the "Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives .... .1 5 As I explain more fully below," 6 the Supreme
Court has held-and I completely agree-that this clause does
not prohibit a state constitution from vesting reapportionment
power in the people of a state acting through their referendum
and initiative powers.13 7 Thus, in this clause of the Constitution,
the term "legislature" of a state has not meant "independent
legislature." Finally, Article IV of the Constitution provides that
no new state shall be carved out of territory from existing states
"without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned .... . 8 I see absolutely no constitutional reason why
direct popular consent, or consent through a special convention,
would not suffice to cede state property validly.
Of course, even a devout "intratextuaist 1 9 would acknowledge that a single term like "state legislature" can mean different things in the same document.' 4 For me, however, these
analogies, particularly the Oregon Plan story, are helpful ones

134. See Rotunda, supra note 125, at 210.
135. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
136. See infra notes 194-207 and accompanying text.
137. See Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916).
138. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
139. "Intratextualism" is a term used to describe the interpretive method by which
similar words or terms in the Constitution are analyzed by reference to each other.
See Akhii Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748-49, 788-95 (1999).
For an extensive example of intratextualism, see Amar, Jury Service, supra note 133.
140. For example, the term "person" may mean different things in different constitutional contexts; corporations are persons for purposes of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, even though they are not persons for purposes of the
Census Clause.
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for a couple of reasons. To begin with, they refute the simplistic
textual argument that "legislature" has to mean "independent
legislature." Relatedly, and more importantly, because of the
structural concerns over self-dealing government agents I discussed at length above, Article V is the least likely candidate in
the Constitution for interpreting "legislature" to mean "independent Legislature."1 4 ' Giving state legislatures absolute and nondelegable control over the selection of United States senators
and the drawing of congressional district lines-matters of "ordinary" government-would have been much more conceivable
than giving them control over federal amendments. Yet, in Article I, we have read "legislature" in its limited sense-that is,
subject to whatever popular control state law sets up. 42 A fortiori, the same should be true for Article V.

II. A BETTER APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING "LEGISLATURE"
IN ARTICLE V

If the term "legislature" cannot, for the textual and structural
reasons identified above, mean "independent legislature," why is
it there? After all, the term "Legislatures... of the... States"
has to mean something, and are we not entitled to infer that
those who wrote and ratified the Constitution deliberately chose
that term over the more generic "state(s)," which is used extensively elsewhere in the document? I think we are, and in the end
I do not think it is hard to see why Article V speaks in terms of
"legislatures." Begin by recalling James Iredell's ringing statement in the North Carolina ratifying convention.' He spoke of
referring Article V matters to state legislatures to save "expense."' 4 As I acknowledged earlier, the Framers expected states
to have ordinary standing legislatures. It makes perfect sense
for the Framers to have wanted to take advantage of what were
likely to be existing institutions in each state to make the
amendment process as efficient as possible. Mason made this
suggestion when the topic of amendment first emerged at the

141.
142.
143.
144.

See supra notes 72-101 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 117-34 and accompanying text.
See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
4 DEBATES, supra note 47, at 177.
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Philadelphia Convention: "[lt will be better to provide for
[amendments] in an easy.., way ..... 145
A second, and more important, explanation for use of the term
"legislature" is also suggested by Iredell, as well as a number of
other prominent Framers, including Mason and Randolph.
Iredell expressed his happy belief that the Constitution could be
"altered with as much regularity, and as little confusion, as any
act of Assembly."1' Earlier, Mason had spoken in similar terms
of the need to "provide for [amendments] in [a] regularand Constitutional way [in order to avoid] chance and violence."147 The
point here is that those who crafted Article V quite naturally
wanted to ensure that there was some smooth, orderly, and
uncontroversial way to handle proposal and ratification so that
disputes about the validity and legitimacy of newly enacted
amendments would be kept to a minimumY'4

This concern over uncertainty suggests that the term "Legislatures ... of the... States" may well have been designed to
avoid confusion generated by a deadlock between a state's executive authority and its legislative authority. Article V is best
read, then, as preferring the state's supreme legislative authority whenever there is a dispute as to federal amendment. Under
this reading, a state can involve the people in the decisions
made by the legislature as long as doing so does not create confusion as a matter of state law about who speaks in the name of
the state's supreme legislative authority in this realm. Another
entailment of this approach would be to view state legislatures
as the constitutional default: Unless and until state law speaks
definitively as to another superseding state authority, Article V
authorizes state legislatures, where they exist, to play an important role in the amendment process. However, when a state has
clearly replaced that default with another republican, that is,
democratic, alternative, Article V is not offended.

145. 1 RECORDS, supra note .73, at 203 (statement of Mason); see also 3 DEBATES,

supra note 47, at 37 (statement of Pendleton) (referring to the amendment method
as "easy").
146. 4 DEBATES, supra note 47, at 177 (emphases added).
147. 1 RECORDS, supra note 73, at 203 (emphasis added).
148. See, e.g., 3 DEBATES, supra note 47, at 37 (statement of Pendleton) (referring
to the amendment process as "quiet").
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Finally, Article V mentions "legislatures" simply to make clear
that states can, if they choose, delegate Article V power to ordinary government representative bodies. In the absence of Article
V, state legislatures would have no constitutional amendment
role at all, and it would be questionable whether the people of a
state could participate in the constitutional amendment process
through a vehicle other than special conventions. 4 9 Remember,
the original Constitution was not, and consistent with federalist
political thought, could not have been ratified simply by the
ordinary legislatures of the thirteen states. 50 As George Mason
put the point: "[T]he authority of the people [is] ... essential .... The Legislatures have no power to ratify [the proposed
federal constitution]. They are the mere creatures of the state
Constitutions, and cannot be greater than their creators."' 5 '
This "authorization" reading of Article V is perfectly consistent with the "default" approach described above. Taken together, they mean that the people of each state are free to influence,
indeed even coerce, Article V decisions so long as state law
speaks clearly. In the absence of a state deviation, however,
Article V presumes the legislature, should one exist, speaks for
the state. The "authorization" reading merely adds to the "default" reading the observation that, in the absence of a state
legislature default in Article V, the people of each state may not
have been able to delegate the power.
III. POTENTIAL COUNTERARGUMENTS
Let us now take up arguments that persons opposing my
thesis may assert. Because the lower court opinions that I criti-

149. See Amar, supra note 23, at 459.
150. See WOOD, supra note 41, at 532-35.
151. 2 RECORDS, supra note 73, at 88; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 252-53
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The proposed Constitution was to be
submitted to the people themselves . ..

."

(emphasis added)); THE FEDERALIST No.

39, at 243 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The Constitution is to be
founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America [and] derived from
the supreme authority in each State-the authority of the people themselves."); TE
FEDERALIST No. 43, at 279 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("This article [VII] speaks for itself. The express authority of the people alone could give due
validity to the Constitution." (emphasis added)).
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cize here make no historical or structural arguments and instead rely exclusively on some old Supreme Court cases, I take
up these old cases first. 152 I then posit some structural arguments against my position that no one has advanced yet, but
that might be asserted as more attention is focused on this important issue.
A. Supreme Court Case Law
Far and away the most important case is Hawke v. Smith,'
decided in 1920. The Hawke decision is featured centrally in
each and every one of the recent rulings invalidating Article V
scarlet letters."M I squarely acknowledge that the broad language from Hawke quoted in Part 1155 suggests that, at least at
the ratification stage, the word "legislature" in Article V does
not include the people. On the other hand, Hawke involved a
supplantation of the legislature by the people and not mere
coercion by the people to force the legislature to act.1 56 Much
more importantly, the broad language in Hawke was not necessary to the result in that case. And there is other language in
the opinion that helps explain, in ways consistent with the reading of Article V that I embrace here, why the case was decided
correctly and was, in fact, an easy call. 57
The facts of Hawke are rarely presented in modern cases
citing it,' 58 and indeed are not all apparent from the Supreme

152. See infra notes 153-207 and accompanying text.
153. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
154. See, e.g., Miller v. Moore, 169 F.3d 1119, 1123-24 (8th Cir. 1999); League of
Women Voters v. Gwadosky, 966 F. Supp. 52, 56-57 (D. Me. 1997); Donovan v.
Priest, 931 S.W.2d 119, 125-27 (Ark. 1996); Bramberg v. Jones, 978 P.2d 1240, 124749 (Cal. 1999).
155. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
156. This is the same textual point I made earlier, when I suggested that scarlet
letters comply with the technical terms of Article V because, whether coerced or not,
the legislature is doing the acting. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
157. Hawke may also be limited to the context of amendments proposed by Congress, as distinguished from those generated by a proposing convention. The idea
would be that where Congress has proposed an amendment, it could attach certain
conditions on its ratification, such as ratification by "independent legislatures."
158. See, e.g., Miller, 169 F.3d at 1123-24; League of Women Voters, 966 F. Supp.
at 56-57; Donovan, 931 S.W.2d at 125-27.
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Court opinion itself. 59 But we cannot easily understand what is
at stake without appreciating the sequence of events.
On December 1, 1917, two-thirds of each house of Congress
adopted a resolution proposing and submitting for ratification
what ultimately became the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution-the alcohol prohibition amendment. 6 ' An important
feature of the resolution was its provision "that the Amendment
should be inoperative unless ratified" by the requisite number of
legislatures of the states "within seven years from the date of...
submission." 1 ' On January 7, 1919, the Senate and House of
Representatives of Ohio, acting as the General Assembly of the
state of Ohio, adopted a resolution ratifying the proposed prohibition amendment and mandated that certified copies of the
joint resolution of ratification be forwarded by the governor of
Ohio to the United States secretary of state and to the presiding
officer of each house of Congress.' 62 On January 27, 1919, the
governor of Ohio complied with the legislature's resolution."
Two days later, the secretary of state of the United States proclaimed that the Eighteenth Amendment had been ratified, listing Ohio as one of the thirty-six states having ratified the
64
same.

1

On March 11, 1919,165 six weeks after the United States secretary of state proclaimed ratification, a voter in Ohio filed with
defendant Harvey Smith, the secretary of state of Ohio, a referendum petition pursuant to provisions in the Ohio Constitution. 166 The petition, which had been signed by the requisite
number of voters, six percent, requested that Mr. Smith prepare

159. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 224-25 (1920).
160. The Eighteenth Amendment, which was repealed by the Twenty-first Amendment, see U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1, had "prohibit[ed] the manufacture, sale or
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the
exporation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction
thereof for beverage purposes." Hawke, 253 U.S. at 224-25.
161. Hawke, 253 U.S. at 225.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See Petition in Common Pleas Court, Record at 16, Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S.
221 (1920) (No. 582).
166. See id. Record at 16-17.
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ballot materials for an election to be held by the people of Ohio
to approve or reject the alcohol prohibition amendment to the
United States Constitution.1 6 7 The 1918 Ohio Constitution "reserve[d] to [the people] themselves the legislative power of the
referendum on the action of the General Assembly ratifying any
proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United
States."'68 By its terms, the Ohio Constitution required that any
legislative ratification not go into effect "until ninety days after
it shall have been adopted by the General Assembly," during
which time signatures could be gathered and a referendum petition could be filed.'69
In April of 1919, plaintiff George Hawke brought suit in Ohio
county court to enjoin Smith from expending any state monies in
preparing and printing forms for the referendum ballot, on the
ground that such a referendum under these circumstances would
violate federal law.'70 The trial court, the state appellate court,
and the Ohio Supreme Court all rejected this claim, holding that
the referendum ballot could proceed.' 7 '
The United States Supreme Court reversed, in effect refusing
to permit the Ohio Constitution's referendum provisions to be
implemented on these facts. 72 In doing so, the Court spoke in
the broad terms quoted earlier, 173 essentially saying that a legislature is a legislature, and not the people. In assessing this
language, we must bear in mind that courts--even the Supreme
Court-are part of the "ordinary government" about whom the
framers displayed distrust. There is an element of elitist antipopulism'74 in the Hawke Court's tone that is difficult to square
167. See id. Record at 19.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See id. Record at 16-21.
171. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 224 (1920).
172. See id. at 231.
173. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
174. I see this elitism in the lower court opinions as well. As evidence of this elitist bias, which plagues me and other law professors too, I should quickly add, consider the California Supreme Court's treatment of the severability clause in the
invalidated Proposition 225. After concluding that the people of California had no
direct role to play in the Article V process, the California Supreme Court turned to
whether any portion of the initiative could be saved. See Bramberg v. Jones, 978
P.2d 1240, 1252 n.19 (Cal. 1999). I submit that it could be saved merely by excising
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with the historical and structural arguments I have advanced.
For these reasons, the passage is very unpersuasive.
Moreover, the Court's broad language was unnecessary to resolve the case before it because there was a much firmer ground
on which to do so, and one that the Court itself suggested. After
explaining that the Ohio referendum could not proceed, the
Court observed: "Any other view might lead to endless confusion
in the manner of ratification of [the] federal amendments."175
Now here is a concern that is rooted in the structure and history
of the Constitution itself. And the facts of the case implicate this
concern as powerfully as one could imagine. Let us not forget
that by the time the referendum petition was filed, the governor
of Ohio had already told the federal authorities that the legislature of Ohio had ratified the Eighteenth Amendment.176
Indeed, things were worse than that for the Ohio referendum
proponents. The United States secretary of state had already
references to "Article V" from Proposition 225. So construed, Proposition 225 merely
would have instructed the California legislature to make a non-Article V application
to Congress, communicating the will of the people of California concerning a federal
term limits amendment. True, under the court's reasoning, Congress would not have
had to "count" this application towards Article V's two-thirds threshold, but so what?
Such an application still might have had an effect on Congress--certainly more effect than disparate communications from individual constituents.
The California court's response to this option is brief but revealing. Citing to an
earlier case, which, of course, it has the power to overrule, the court observed:
"[I]nsofar as a provision of an initiative measure simply adopts a resolution calling
upon Congress to propose an amendment

. .

. , the measure 'does not create law

and thus . . . does not "adopt" a "statute" within the meaning of' [the voters' initiative powers in the California Constitution]." Id (quoting AFL-CIO v. Eu, 686 P.2d
609, 628 (Cal. 1984)).
The problem I have with this reasoning is simple: Proposition 225, construed to
excise the "unconstitutional" references to Article V, does more than "adopt] a resolution calling upon Congress," it imposes a statutory duty on the California legislature to take an act-to expend funds to make a non-Article V application on behalf
of the people of California for whatever it may be worth. A "resolution" by the people is not quite the same thing as an "Application," even one that will not count for
Article V purposes, by the legislature on behalf of the people. For a variety of reasons, the latter may have more impact. Surely if the people of California through
the initiative instructed the state legislature to expend funds on some other communicative activity, say antismoking ads, we would say that initiative "creates law."
It is far from clear to me why Proposition 225's obligations, though only directed to
the legislature, are not obligations arising from a "law."
175. Hawke, 253 U.S. at 230 (emphasis added).
176. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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proclaimed the validity of the new amendment. 1 7 Did anyone
really think the people of Ohio could reopen the validity of an
amendment already proclaimed by the federal government to be
the Supreme Law of the land? To put the point another way, by
ordering the governor to communicate ratification-apparently
in violation of the ninety-day waiting period 78-- the Ohio legislature effectively blocked the state referendum procedure from
being used. A very different case would have been presented,
however, had referendum proponents been able to get into court
to enforce the Ohio Constitution before legislative ratification
was communicated to Washington. Given the way things did in
fact happen, had the United States Supreme Court given effect
to the referendum provision, an immensely uncertain situation
would have resulted. In some ways, then, Hawke can be understood to be more about the lack of remedies for state law breaches than it was about state law conflict with Article V. 7"
The Supreme Court even acknowledged much of this two
years later, in Leser v. Garnett,' when it affirmed the validity
of the Nineteenth Amendment over objections that various
states had improperly ratified the Amendment in violation of
state legislative procedures."' In dispensing with the challenge,
the Court explicitly relied on the ground that the governors of
the states in question had-whether or not they complied with
state law in doing so 82 -already certified to the federal govern177. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
178. The governor communicated ratification to the United States secretary of state
20 days after the state legislature ratified the amendment. See supra notes 162-63

and accompanying text. This apparently violated Ohio's law because the Constitution
of Ohio mandated that no ratification "shall go into effect until ninety days after it
shall have been adopted by the General Assembly." Petition in Common Pleas Court,
Record at 19, Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920) (No. 582).
179. Cf 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 45, at 741 -(observing that "binding" instructions need not void the vote of faithless agents).
180. 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
181. See id at 137. Plaintiffs in Leser also challenged ratification in some states on
the same ground unsuccessfully urged in Hawke-that violation of state referendum
laws made ratification ineffective. See id. On this point, the Leser Court merely cited

Hawke. See id.
182. The Leser Court explained that as long as the "legislatures . . . had power to
adopt the resolutions of ratification," their having done so was conclusive upon the

United States secretary of state. I& Of course, this reasoning really did not take
head on the plaintiff's argument that because the legislatures in question had vio-
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ment, and that certainty required respect for these certifications." 3 This makes perfect sense. How could we expect federal executive and legislative officials, to whom notice of certification by states is sent, to arbitrate disputes about what state
law means? One way to understand the reference to "legislatures" in Article V, then, is to say that their communication to
Congress counts as "official"; but this does not mean that Article
V prevents state law from coercing state legislatures into communicating to the federal government the message that pleases
the people. Courts, like the California Supreme Court in the
Proposition 225 case,'1 4 are fully capable of enforcing this coercion before the fact in ways that avoid confusion and uncertainty.
Given all this, to the extent that Leser adds anything,185 the
light it casts backward on Hawke might be a narrowing one.186
lated "rules of legislative procedure," they lacked "power." Id. In any event, for our
purposes, if violation of procedural rules in Leser does not deprive a state legislature
of power, then neither should violation of the referendum provisions at issue in
Hawke and at issue in another part of Leser have deprived the Ohio legislature of
its power. Ohio's certification to the federal government in Hawke, then, is "conclusive" by the reasoning of Leser without regard to whether Ohio law violated Article V.
183. See id. (relying on Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 669-73 (1892)).
184. See Bramberg v. Jones, 978 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1999).
185. The precedential value of Leser is weakened by the fact that, as the Court
itself noted, the states whose ratification was in question were unnecessary to the
ultimate ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment inasmuch as enough other states
had already ratified it. See Leser, 258 U.S. at 137. One could argue, I suppose, that
because some of the unchallenged state ratifications took place after some of the
challenged state ratifications, those unchallenged subsequent ratifications may have
been improperly influenced by the earlier "illegal" ratifications being contested in
Leser. Perhaps it is for that reason the Court went on to discuss the merits of the
plaintiffs' claims that various ratifying states had violated state referendum and
state procedural rules.
186. Mike Paulsen has noted this aspect of Leser.
Of course, the state's transmission of its ratification should be one that
federal authorities may take at face value ....

(The Court so held just

two years after Hawke, in Leser v. Garnett). It is thus the responsibility
of state authorities to enforce any state law procedural condition subsequent prior to transmittal ....
Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V The Constitutional Lessons of
the Twenty-seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 732 (1993). Because of the opacity of the Hawke opinion, however, Professor Paulsen did not realize that Leser narrowed Hawke and at the same time made its outcome correct. Accordingly, Professor
Paulsen suggests that Hawke was "wrongly decided." See id. at 731 ("On balance, . . . the [best thing to do] is simply to recognize that Hawke was wrongly
decided."). In a discussion with him, I think I have convinced Professor Paulsen that
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The other opinion involving the Supreme Court that often is
mentioned in the scarlet letter debates-though this time by
scarlet letter proponents-is Kimble v. Swackhamer,18 7 written
in 1978. Kimble was not a decision by the full Court. Rather, it
was an in-chambers opinion by then-Justice Rehnquist.18 Acting
in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Ninth Circuit, he refused to enjoin a Nevada law that called for a state popular
election to provide advice to the Nevada legislature on the question of ratifying the Equal Rights Amendment.18 9 Obviously,
Swackhamer is a limited decision. First,, it involved only one
Justice."9 Second, it involved a purely advisory referendum that
had no legal or ballot designation ramifications. 9' Third, and no
one until the California Supreme Court in the Proposition 225
opinion had mentioned this, 192 " it involved input of the people
sought by the legislature rather than imposed by the people
themselves.19 3
There is one other Supreme Court case, decided a few terms
before Hawke, that I think is very important, Davis v.
Hildebrant,19 although no one else seems to talk about it. Davis
involved a challenge to popular involvement not in Article V, but
rather in Article I, Section 4, which, as I noted above, like Article V uses the term state "legislature."19 5 Article I, Section 4,
Clause 1 provides in full: "The Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,
except as to the Places of chosing Senators."' 9

Hawke has unnecessary and unpersuasive language, but is correct on its facts and
susceptible of a narrower reading consistent with its reference to "confusion."
187. 439 U.S. 1385 (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice 1978).
188. See id
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 1386.
192. See Bramberg v. Jones, 978 P.2d 1240, 1248 (Cal. 1999).
193. In other words, the advisory referendum was itself the product of a Nevada
legislative statute. See Kimble, 439 U.S. at 1386.
194. 241 U.S. 565 (1916).
195. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
196. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
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The plaintiffs in Davis challenged another progressive feature
of the Ohio Constitution-the provision that empowered the
people of Ohio directly to engage in congressional redistricting
by the initiative and referendum process. 19 7 They argued, as do
challengers to today's scarlet letters, that "legislature" in Article
I, Section 4 means a representative body rather than the people
acting directly. 9 ' Accordingly, the plaintiffs argued, Ohio's redistricting done by the people in 1916 did not have the force of
law. 199
The Supreme Court rejected this challenge to redistricting by
referendum, relying on Congress's apparent tolerance of popular
participation. 2 °0 The Court noted that Congress, in an earlier
federal statute enacted in 1911, had inserted a clause that was
"plainly intended to provide that where by the state constitution
and laws the referendum was treated as part of the legislative
power, the power as thus constituted should be held and treated
to be the state legislative power for the purpose of creating congressional districts by law."20 1 This congressional statement,

reasoned the
Court, effectively cured any problem that otherwise
2 02
would exist.

At first blush, the Davis Court's approach seems reasonable
and not necessarily inconsistent with Hawke. After all, the textual grant of power to Congress in Article I, Section 4 does seem
to distinguish this clause from Article V, where Congress enjoys
no such broad discretion. 2" But a closer look at Davis reveals
that the reliance placed on the congressional Act becomes more
complicated and Davis becomes much more difficult to reconcile
with the broad statements in Hawke. Why? Because as a textual
matter-and Davis purports to be a textual decision relying on
the textual power Congress enjoys under Article I, Section

197. See Davis, 241 U.S. at 566-67.
198. See id. at 567.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 568-69.
201. Id. at 568.
202. See id. at 568-69.
203. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (allowing Congress to make or alter
regulations governing elections for senators and representatives), with id. art. V (proscribing the specific proposal and ratification process for amendments).
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4 2 -Congress itself in 1911 did not "make or alter" any "regulation." Instead, it merely created authority in states, subject only
to state law constraints, for them to make such regulations in
any way they wanted and to define "legislative power" for these
purposes to include the people. 0 5 That is precisely the way the
Court characterized the federal statute, both in Davis20 6 itself
and in the discussion of Davis in Hawke."' But if Congress is
not making any laws itself and is merely saying it thinks a definition of "legislature" for Article I, Section 4 that includes popular power is reasonable enough to permit state law flexibility,
why not the same for Article V? In the end, then, I think Davis
is in tension with a broad reading of Hawke, such that Hawke is
bracketed by two decisions, Davis before it and Leser after it,
both of which may counsel in favor of a narrower understanding
of the Hawke result.
B. Possible StructuralArguments Against PopularInput
There are two other kinds of arguments that, though not
articulated by any of the courts in this area, may lurk beneath
the results. I think neither of these arguments works on its own
terms, and certainly neither can overcome the structural and
historical arguments I have advanced above.
1. Competitive Federalism
The first set of structural arguments to consider are those
that have been invoked recently by the Court, in cases such as
New York v. United States, °8 to protect state legislative preroga204. See Davis, 241 U.S. at 569.
205. See id.
206. See id. ("[T]he referendum... should be held and treated to be the state
legislative power for the purpose of creating congressional districts by law." (emphases added)).
207. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 230 (1920) (noting that in Davis, "Con-

gress had itself recognized the referendum as part of the legislative authority ...
(emphases added)).

208. 505 U.S. 144 (1992); see also Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524
U.S. 206 (1998) (reviewing the applicability of the Federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 to a state prison system); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997) (applying the prohibition on commandeering to the Brady Act, a federal stat-

ute requiring state officials to make a reasonable effort to determine if certain pro-

1084

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1037

live against coercion from without-from the federal government-rather than from within." 9 On the view adopted in these
cases, one of the primary virtues of federalism is the creation of
two levels of government, each of which will keep the other in
check.210 The federal government watches over state governments and state governments blow the whistle on federal overreaching, with individual liberty and happiness being the beneficiaries. In cases like New York,"' the Court worries about accountability and monopolization-of-time problems that arise
when the federal government "commandeers" state legislatures
to do federal bidding."l In such a situation, state legislators may
get derailed improperly from their own business and may also
be improperly blamed for bad federal policies by the people, and
thus weakened in their eyes. Perhaps the crispest articulation of
this idea by the Court comes from Gregory v. Ashcroft,21 and
was repeated in the following form in New York:
[Tihe Constitution divides authority between federal and
state governments for the protection of individuals. State
sovereignty is not just an end in itself. Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of
sovereign power. Just as the separation and independence of
the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to
prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one
branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and
the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and
abuse from either front.214
The idea as applied to Article V would be that we should
interpret the amendment process to make it difficult to enact

spective firearm sales would be illegal).
209. See New York, 505 U.S. at 161.
210. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 921.
211. See Mathew P. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism:
New York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. 'REV. 71, 79 (observing that "tyranny
prevention" value "has figured most prominently in the recent case law" like New
York).
212. See New York, 505 U.S. at 169 ("Accountability is thus diminished when, due
to Federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the
view of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by Federal regulations.").
213. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
214. New York, 505 U.S. at 181 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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amendments that have the effect of weakening state government, and that state legislatures are best situated to appreciate
and safeguard the institutional interests of state government
against federal intrusion. Therefore, the amendment process
should involve, as much as possible, state legislatures rather
than the people, who may not have the experience (or selfish
incentives) to understand the importance of state governmen't.
It is true, as observed above, that Article V was animated by a
concern about selfish aggrandizement of federal powers, all of
which explains why Congress was not given a veto. 1 5 However,
it is hard to leap from this observation to an affirmative grant of
any protection of state legislatures. Indeed, the text and structure of Article V seem to foreclose such a move. In particular,
under the straightforward terms of Article V, Congress can,
without input from state legislatures, propose a self-enhancing
amendment that, at Congress's direction, can be ratified not by
state legislatures but by state conventions.2 16 Because state
legislatures are not in control of conventions, which instead are
drawn from and answer directly to the people, 1 7 the federal
government-the chief rival of state government on this view of
federalism--can remain completely within Article V bounds and
yet promote amendments reducing state legislative power without state legislatures having any formal input. 18 Article V sim-

ply does not guarantee that state legislatures are included in the
amendment process to protect themselves.
Now someone might respond by saying: "Precisely because
Congress has the power to propose whatever constitutional
amendments it wants in order to further its self-aggrandizing
agenda, we should read Article V to permit state legislatures
that same unfettered discretion in determining which amendments they would like to have enacted. Ater all, if we are guided by a theory of federalism that emphasizes healthy competition, should not state legislatures have available to them what
215. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
216. This is true even if the amendment calls for a state to relinquish its proportional representation in the House. See U.S. CONST. art. V (providing "that no state,
without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate").
217. That is the whole point of a ratifying convention.
218. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
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their competitor does?" The simple response to this is that the
words, structure, and history of Article V reject parity between
Congress and state legislatures. I just noted that Congress has
the unfettered power to propose. In contrast, state legislatures,
even if we read the term "legislatures"to mean "independent

legislatures," simply lack that power under Article V. Instead,
Article V provides only that state legislatures, or more specifically two-thirds of them, can force Congress to "call a Convention for proposing Amendments ... 2. 1 9 This convention, in turn,
will have discretion 220 whether to propose any amendments for
ratification at all. Indeed, the penultimate draft of Article V, as
Professor Dellinger has pointed out, would have given state
legislatures precisely the same power to propose amendments
and have them voted on as enjoyed by Congress. 22 1 But the
Framers rejected that version in favor of the final version that
deprives states of the power to propose.2 2

219. Id.

220. This is clear historically and textually. Because Congress is acknowledged to
have discretion in proposing, so too would a convention. Indeed, there has never
been a question about whether a convention would have discretion to propose or not
propose. There has been a debate on whether the convention can propose amendments outside the scope of the applications of the states. See Dellinger, supra note
78, at 1636-38. I take no view on this, except to say that if there is such unfettered
discretion, it comes, as Charles Black suggested, from the nature of the term "Convention to propose" itself, and the fact that the Convention in Philadelphia enjoyed
full discretion. See id. at 1624 n.5 (citing Charles Black, Amending the Constitution:
A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J. 189, 189 (1972)). The argument for unbridled convention power made by Walter Dellinger, see id. at 1630-31, resting on the
historical desire that state legislatures not be able to propose on their own, would
be completely addressed by a veto power on the part of the national convention and
does not require broad-ranging power to propose amendments unrelated to the issues
giving rise to the convention. Of course, under any reading, the convention would
have to enjoy the power to decide what "unrelated" means in this context.
221. See Dellinger, supra note 78, at 1625.
222. It is for these reasons that the Court has never included Article V in the
"political safeguards of federalism" theory that animates, for example, the Garcia
decision. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-51 &
n.1 (1985).
I should add that a competition can be healthy, even if both sides are not
armed identically. The simple fact is that no matter how we read Article V, Congress and the states do not have identical sets of weapons in the federalism battle
for the hearts and minds of the people. There are a number of important respects
outside the federal amendment process in which Congress has more power to compete. For example, it can preempt state lawmaking power by virtue of supremacy. It
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2. Filtration

The other structural argument that may be invoked to support reading the term "legislature" to mean "independent legislature" is grounded in filtration and deliberation. The notion here
is pretty simple: The Constitution in large measure reflects distrust of passionate popular majorities, and the requirement of
independence on the part of state legislatures ensures that decisions concerning federal amendment will be more thoughtful
and judicious. 2"
There are a number of powerful responses. To begin with,
there is no historical evidence reflecting this deliberative view
of state legislatures in the Article V setting.2" Instead, the
Framers' analyses of Article V at the Philadelphia Convention,
in The FederalistPapers, and the state ratifying conventions use
is not hamstrung, because of the rejection of the "instruction" language proposed in
the First Amendment, by popular meddling in fashioning ordinary law. Everyone
concedes the permissibility of instruction of state legislatures in most everyday legislative activities, but this means state legislatures may be less free to prove their
stuff, for example, by passing currently unpopular laws that look wise in a few
years, than is Congress. Yet this fact has not lead us to construe the Tenth Amendment or anything else in the Constitution as interfering with the right of the people
to instruct their state legislatures as a general matter.
I do not mean to suggest that state government is less well armed than Congress in all respects. Their proximity to the people might give them access and
credibility those inside the beltway lack. In any event, my point here is that the
competitive balance of federalism does not, and could not, require Congress and
state legislatures to be accorded identical treatment.
223. Cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 315-16 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (warning against the danger of public passions in putting constitutional questions to a decision of the whole society).
224. Compare this with the "indirect" election of senators under Article I before the
Seventeenth Amendment and the selection of presidential electors under Article II.
For example, James Madison described the Senate election process under Article I as
having the advantage of "favoring a select appointment." THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at
377 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
In a similar vein, Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 68 defended the presidential
election scheme in the following terms:
It

was ...

desirable that the immediate election [of the President]

should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted
to the station and acting under" circumstances favorable to deliberation,
and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements which
were proper to govern their choice.
THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis added).
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the terms "legislatures of the states" and "states" interchangeably and suggest, if anything, that state legislatures were to
mirror the people in the states. 225 Nor is it surprising that there

is no discussion of state legislatures as "filters" here. Most importantly, for the structural reasons I discussed above, state
legislatures were the last bodies appropriate to serve as filters. 2 6 Recall yet again that when the original Constitution was
ratified, the Framers explicitly rejected state legislatures as
legitimate ratifiers because, as organs of227
ordinary government,
they were presumptively improper filters.

Moreover, it is not clear that the people acting directly need
any filters in the amendment context.228 The state ratifying "conventions" that Article V authorizes Congress to choose may be
defined broadly enough to include popular democracy. In other
words, it might be that Congress can choose direct democracy as
a route to ratify proposed amendments. If this is so, then it is
not obvious why the people would be thought competent to ratify
but not competent to be involved in the proposal process.
Related to this notion, consider that at the time of the framing
the state of Rhode Island thought that a successful popular
referendum would have sufficed to ratify the original Constitution, even though Article VII of the Constitution refers only to
the "Ratification of the Conventions of ... States."229 Responding

to the objection that popular referendum would not have been
enough, Rhode Island's Governor Collins explained:
Although this state has been singular from her sister states
in the mode of collecting sentiments of the people upon the
Constitution, it was not done with the least design to give
any offence to the respectable body of those who composed
225. See, e.g., 4 DEBATES, supra note 47, at 177 (statement of Iredell) ("[State legis-

latures], it may be presumed, . . . will speak the genuine sense of the people."); see
also THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 313-17 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(discussing conventions for proposing amendments to the Constitution and arguing
that the legislatures reflected the will of the people).
226. See supra notes 72-101 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
228. Of course, a filter is not the same thing as deliberation. The latter may exist
through requirements of "cooling off" periods and multiple elections, without the
downside of the former.
229. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
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the [Philadelphia] convention, or a disregard to the recommendation of Congress, but upon pure republican principles,
founded upon that basis of all governments originally deriving from the body of the people at large.' 0
Finally, and in any event, the "filtration" argument collapses,
as did the federalism argument, under the weight of the structure of Article V itself. Put simply, concerns about filtration are
already addressed by the rest of Article V, no matter how we
read the word "legislature." Remember, when two-thirds of the
states apply, all that happens is Congress assembles a national
convention."' This national convention is a big, deliberative filter that completely satisfies concerns about hasty or passionate
changes in the Constitution. 2 Indeed, it is a much more deliberative filter than are the state legislatures. Like Congress, it is a
nationalbody that allows delegates from each state to meet and
compare concerns. Additionally, because the proposing convention is a national entity that did not predate the Constitution,
it-just like Congress or the Philadelphia Convention that created it--would not be amenable to instruction. 23 For this reason,
it would have complete discretion to screen out passionate and
hasty amendments. If even further filtration were needed, it can
be found in the high supermajority requirements in Article V

230. Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CmH. L.
REV. 475, 528 (1995); see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND
IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 112 (1996) (indicating that Rhode

Island's actions were legitimate under legal principles of the founding).
231. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
232. If the deliberation concern is styled not in terms of unwise amendments, but
rather unwise failures to amend, there would be no justification for refusing popular
calls for a convention. At most, this argument would justify an independent power
on the part of state legislatures to make applications-not to block any.
233. In the same way, the electors of the so-called electoral college may be free
agents. I say "may" here because, on the one hand, the electoral college, like Congress and an Article V proposing convention, is truly a national group whose existence owes entirely to the Constitution. On the other hand, the electoral college does
not "meet" and deliberate like Congress or an Article V proposing convention. The
question of whether electors can be "bound" and be punished for breaking pledges is
therefore an open one. Cf. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952) (finding that the
Twelfth Amendment does not demand absolute freedom for the presidential elector to
vote his own choice and that an Alabama Democratic Party pledge requirement was
not unconstitutional).
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and the time required to surmount such supermajority requirements.2 34
IV. THE QUESTION OF COERCING FEDERAL LEGISLATORS
Thus far, I have concentrated on coercive measures as applied
to state legislators. As has been implicit through much of my
discussion, the analysis is quite different with regard to federal
legislators. As I have explained at length,23 5 shortly after ratification, language that would have included a right to instruct
Congress was proposed as part of the Bill of Rights and was
consciously rejected for sound reasons recounted above. 236 This
episode, together with cases like Thornton23 7 and McCulloch v.
Maryland2 8 stand for the proposition that, unlike state legislatures, Congress is not an agent of people of the states for any
purpose.3 9 The people of a state cannot displace Congress or
preempt it by making law directly in the way they can displace
their state legislature.24 ° The people of the states do not pay
Congress's salaries the way they pay their state legislators'
salaries; the federal treasury does. 241 Additionally, the people of
the states cannot recall Congresspersons. In all respects, Congress is a federal institution and Congresspersons wear only one
hat-a federal hat.
Moreover, as to the House of Representatives, there may be
another problem with scarlet letters and other coercive devices.
Federal statutes require that House members be elected by
district and not by all the voters in a state.24" These federal

234. See, e.g., 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES app. at 371-72
(1803), reprinted in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSITUTION, supra note 85, at 583; see also

3 STORY, supra note 101, § 1824 (discussing the Article V amendment process and
concluding that the "guards . . . against the too hasty exercise of the power . . . are

apparently sufficient").
235. See supra notes 45-66 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
237. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995); see supra notes 5-16
and accompanying text.
238. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
239. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 803; McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 328.
240. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 798; McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 328.
241. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
242. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 2c (1994).
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statutes trump inconsistent state law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause.2"3 Thus, any instruction by the people of a state
as a whole to individual House members, even if unproblematic
on other grounds, might violate federal statutes.
Also, any attempt to enforce scarlet letters and other coercive
devices might, if taken too far, run afoul of Thornton itself to the
extent that such efforts may be seen as adding qualifications for
federal office beyond those in the Constitution.2 Finally, any
scarlet letter devices as to federal incumbents certainly could be
undone by Congress through its Article I, Section 4 power to
"make or alter" laws governing congressional elections.2 4 5 Of
course, such congressional action may be difficult politically.
CONCLUSION

Having disposed of the problem raised by federal instructions,
let us now turn back one last time to popular control of state
legislators, and to the scarlet letter device itself. To say that the
Article V reasoning of the recent decisions has been shoddy is
not to approve of each and every scarlet letter device that has
been challenged. I recognize that scarlet letters and other coercive devices may raise important constitutional questions that
have nothing to do with the use of the word "legislature" in Article V.246 These interesting questions must await further consid-

243.
244.
245.
246.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 800-01.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
A meaningful analysis of these other concerns requires consideration of many

factors which I shall be examining in another article. For now, by way of an appetizer, let me quickly and tentatively flag just three of the many possible residual

concerns some people may have about scarlet letters.
First, and somewhat ironically in light of the discussion so far, I would be worried if a scarlet letter device originated from the legislature itself, rather than from

the people through the voter initiative. For example, if a majority of legislators want
to stigmatize those individuals who will not go along with some popular program by
a notation at the next election, I begin to worry about improper entrenchment. See
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY MD DISTRUST (1980). Second, I wonder how easy it is
to decide whether a legislator has disregarded voter instructions such that the ballot
notation is triggered. The more discretionary the task of identifying faithless legislators, the more I worry about who is doing the identifying and how the person or
entity is doing. it. Third, I worry about what the ballot designation itself says, and
whether the designation could be misleading or inflammatory. For example, would it
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eration. But that is all right-it is always nice to have something exciting to look forward to.

be constitutional to require a ballot notation of "PROMOTES RACIST POLICIES" for
any legislator who voted in the previous session for any race conscious remedial
program? There may be special concerns about voter deception that counsel in favor
of judicial scrutiny of proposed ballot designations. To be sure, notations of political
party identity can be misleading, but they seem different in kind. Cf Rotunda, supra note 125, at 210. Moreover, is it so clear that government could impose a party
identification next to the name of a candidate on the ballot who would rather not
have one?

